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Abstract
This thesis explores 1) the ways that three Vietnamese infrastructure
development projects undermine their cities’ climate change adaptation goals and
2) the political and economic forces driving these developments. In-depth
interviews highlight four main perspectives of planners and decision makers, which
explain why these infrastructure projects often undermine cities’ climate resilience
goals. I describe how the mainstream climate change adaptation planning approach,
with its emphasis on participatory planning, good governance and green growth,
implicitly reinforces the neoliberal growth model, even as it seeks to ameliorate the
inequality and ecological destruction that such a growth model creates. My research
reveals how Vietnam’s growth-first economic model and its dependence on
international finance means that its climate adaptation priorities are increasingly
shaped by the interests of financial institutions, and not necessarily the public
interest. I argue that even if the strategies proposed by Vietnamese planners and
climate adaptation practitioners are adopted, maladaptive projects will continue in
Vietnam, unless the underlying economic growth imperative is addressed.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
On November 4, 2017, Typhoon Damrey struck Vietnam and killed over 106
people, and affected about four million people across fourteen provinces in central
and southern Vietnam. Less than a week later on Nov 10, 2017, Vietnam hosted the
final convening of the yearlong Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings
in Da Nang Vietnam, one of the cities directly impacted. Despite the still-emergency
conditions which had left many poor communities without clean water supplies, the
Vietnamese leaders made no comment about the devastating and deadly floods. The
speeches and opening remarks by Vietnamese and other world leaders emphasized
the growing prosperity that would arise from increased global trade integration.
Even as Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang mentioned the need to build
climate resilience, his speech and the speeches of others ignored the fact that the
hotel resort where the world leaders are staying, located in the heart of Son Tra
Nature Reserve, is a stark example of the very kind of development in natural areas
that increases Vietnam’s vulnerability to climate change. In fact, the Frankfurt
Zoological Society warned earlier in March of 2017, that if hotel and resort
construction in the Nature Zone did not stop, the green Son Tra rainforest, also
called the “lungs of Danang” would become a desert and threaten many endangered
species with extinction within the next thirty years (Voice of Vietnam 2017). Indeed,
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the remarks from President Trump and other world leaders staying at the
Intercontinental Hotel implied that the economic development discussions and
actions spurred by APEC had little connection to the intensified flooding, droughts,
and hurricanes that have struck Vietnam over the past decade.
APEC is not alone in failing to connect the dots between economic
development and climate change vulnerability. A brief scan of climate change
adaptation literature—from World Bank and NGO reports, to academic journal
articles and books—reveals that discussions of economic development strategy and
climate change adaptation are usually kept separate. When they are discussed
together, there is often an assumption and assertion that there is no contradiction
between the two goals. For example, Korean and Japanese development agencies
such as KOICA and JICA, have increasingly been promoting “green growth” as a
strategy to both adapt to climate change and promote economic development.
Similarly, popular conceptions of the “three foundations of sustainability” (social
equity, economic prosperity, and environmental protection) generally ignore the
conflicts or tensions between the three goals.
Despite the increased attention to Vietnam’s tremendous vulnerability to
climate change, urban development is actually going in the opposite direction:
increasing development into critical farmland, wetlands, floodplains, and coastal
ecosystems that undermines a city’s ability to protect itself from sea level rise,
flooding, and superstorms. This paper examines firstly, how urban and
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infrastructure developments are undermining climate adaptation strategies, and
secondly, why economic development strategies are frequently undermining
climate resilience strategies. This thesis addresses the gap in the climate change
adaptation planning literature and explains how economic development strategies
are inextricably connected to climate change adaptation strategy because economic
and urban development decisions clearly and directly impact a city’s ability to build
their climate resilience.
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Research Questions and Methodology
This thesis explores two key research questions: 1) how are Vietnamese
infrastructure development projects impacting cities’ climate change adaptation

List of Interview Participants
Government planners and officials
•
•
•
•
•

Head of Urban Development Management Division, Ministry of Construction
Researcher, Development Studies Institute, Ministry of Planning and
Investment
Deputy Director General, Vietnam Institute for Urban and Rural Planning
Strategic Planner, Urban Development Division, Ministry of Construction
Director, Institute of International Cooperation, Academy of Managers of
Construction

Academic Researchers
•
•

Professor, Academy of Planning and Development
Professor, Climate Change and Development Program, Vietnam-Japan
University

Non-governmental organizations (NGO) workers
•
•
•

Technical Lead, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition,
International
Technical Consultant, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition,
International
Director, UN-HABITAT Vietnam

FIGURE 1: LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
goals and 2)

what are

the economic forces driving these development projects? My primary research
methods involved 1) ten in-depth qualitative interviews conducted in-person and
via Skype, and 2) document analysis of key Vietnamese documents, reports, and
articles about economic development, urban infrastructure development, and
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climate change adaptation. I reviewed both national and local climate adaptation
plans and reports, as well as contemporary newspaper and journal articles to gain
some more background on the projects and examples which my interview subjects
discussed. My interview subjects included a variety of planners, decision-makers
and stakeholders engaged in climate change or urban development work in
Vietnam, including: planners in the Ministry of Construction, planners in the
Ministry of Planning and Investment, professors of climate change and
development, and NGO staffers working on climate change and development (see
Figure 1). To protect their privacy, I include the government institutions, but not the
specific names of the people, unless they expressly provided permission.
My research questions were shaped by my experience working in Vietnam as
an intern for two non-governmental organizations working on climate change
adaptation in Vietnam. In the summer of 2012, I travelled to Danang, Vietnam as an
intern with UN-HABITAT. I spent two months, from late July to early September,
2012 in Vietnam, attending climate change conferences and meetings and interning
at UN-HABITAT’s Vietnam office to help them prepare for a climate change
adaptation training and workshop with Ho Chi Minh City’s Department of Natural
Resources and the Environment. The next summer in 2013, I worked as an intern
with the Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, the leading international
non-governmental organization (NGO) which has been leading climate change
adaptation planning in Vietnamese cities, including Danang, Quy Nhon, Lao Cai, and
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Can Tho. The lessons and experiences I gained as a participant and observer in these
climate change/development spaces provided the foundation and shaped my
research question.

Overview
The first chapter of this thesis reviews the impacts of both climate change
and of economic development on urban areas in Vietnam. I look at the contradictory
results emerging between economic development projects and climate adaptation
goals by looking specifically at three important examples: road infrastructure,
industrial zone development, and energy infrastructure. These three projects
highlight the ways in which Vietnamese cities’ development and growth strategies
directly contradict expressed climate adaptation goals.
In the second chapter, I examine mainstream climate change adaptation
planning, to understand the gaps in the planning process that allow development
projects to move forward and undermine a city’s resilience to climate change. Some
of these forces are related to Vietnam’s specific planning processes, while others are
more inherent to the economic model which Vietnam has embraced. The current
literature on climate change adaptation planning in Vietnam primarily focuses on
process-related problems and makes recommendations for how to improve
planning, public outreach, and implementation to avoid the worst outcomes.
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However, there is currently very little literature exploring the inherent
contradictions between economic growth imperatives and climate adaptation.
In the third chapter, I explore what my interviewees generally described as
some of the factors leading to these maladaptive projects. They highlighted various
planning and governance challenges, however, none of the respondents challenged
the underlying economic growth model which drives much of the urban and
infrastructure development. The central argument of this thesis is that a city’s and
country’s economic development model must be included and critiqued in any
analysis of climate adaptation strategies.
The fourth chapter of this paper explores the economic forces that shape
Vietnamese urban development and the ways in which Vietnamese urban
governance and planning also shapes development choices, and thus, urban
development outcomes. Currently described as a “market-based mixed economy,”
Vietnam’s economy combines elements of state planning with liberalized market
reforms to integrate into the global economy. The liberalization of Vietnam’s
economy has important implications for its economic development strategy. I look
at how the financing of these projects reveal the external constraints of
international finance that limit Vietnam’s autonomy. This section explores the
resulting tensions and contradictions between local climate adaptation and
economic growth strategies.
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The fifth chapter critically examines the mainstream climate change
adaptation approach, with its focus on improving planning processes, while ignoring
the larger political choices and economic development models which are assumed
yet not raised in the climate adaptation literature. I argue that Vietnam is stuck
between the proverbial rock and a hot and hard place because its model of exportled, growth-oriented development is requiring the country to develop infrastructure
which is at odds with the necessary steps Vietnamese cities need to take to build
their climate resilience. The sixth and final chapter of this thesis explores some core
concepts of a more genuine and effective climate resilience strategy for Vietnamese
cities.
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Literature Review
My thesis is based on the theoretical gap that I see in the mainstream climate
change adaptation literature. I draw heavily from the theories within urban
geography and critical theory to understand the ways in which a deeper
understanding of the political economy of Vietnam can explain the failures of urban
development to build climate resilience in Vietnam. Ultimately, building a more
effective climate change adaptation planning framework entails confronting the
political and economic forces which are creating both inequality and environmental
destruction.
To begin with, climate policy and planning is generally divided into two main
categories: 1) climate change mitigation, which is any action that reduces
greenhouse gas emissions which are causing climate change and 2) climate change
adaptation, which is defined as “preparing for, and adjusting proactively to,
projected climate change impacts, both negative impacts, as well as potential
opportunities (World Bank 2011). In general, climate change mitigation strategies
have focused on advanced industrialized countries, which are responsible for the
bulk of historical emissions. Yet the already-increasing impacts of climate change,
particularly in the Global South, is lifting up the crucial importance of preparing for
adapting to the climate change impacts, which are inevitable, given historical
emissions.
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Climate change adaptation is described as a diverse set of formal and
informal actions and policies which local areas can adopt in order to prepare for
coming climate-related changes of sea-level rise, stronger and more frequent
storms, changes in rainfall patterns, higher temperatures, and increased flooding.
Climate change adaptation, then, is a broad umbrella term encompassing everything
from building ‘hard’ infrastructure such as sea dykes and improved weather
forecasting systems, to investing in ‘soft’ infrastructure such as educating farms
about diversifying crops or strengthening disaster-preparedness education.
Climate change adaptation planning literature borrows heavily from disaster
risk reduction literature, with a particularly strong emphasis on understanding
specific climate risks that a city faces (Moench et al., 2011a). Thus, scientific models
and projections of climate impacts, as well as the data necessary to make those
models---are highly valued and centered in the adaptation literature, as the
foundation for climate adaptation planning. Urban climate adaptation plans tend to
focus on the specific climate change impacts, such as extreme heat or flooding, and
to propose specific measures that a city, state, nation, or community can take
(Tanner et al., 2009). In a recent report on “Catalyzing Urban Resilience” the nonprofit Institute for Social and Environmental Transition (ISET) writes, “the framing
of climate change adaptation in relationship to specific climate change impacts
perpetuates the ‘predict and prevent’ paradigm that has traditionally underpinned
geo-hazard engineering. Hence, current approaches to urban climate adaptation
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have a tendency to focus on technical responses to particular climate hazards, such
as defensive coastal infrastructure or zoning coastal areas in response to sea level
rise” (2017).
To move beyond a narrow focus on specific climate impacts towards a more
systems-based approach, many climate adaptation planners have embraced the
concept of “climate resilience.” A resilient city is “characterized by its capacity to
with and or absorb the impact of a [climate] hazard through resistance or
adaptation, which enable it to maintain certain basic functions and structures
during a crisis, and bounce back or recover from an event (Johnson and Blackburn,
2014). Because building a community’s adaptive capacity is connected to building
community resilience, I use the terms “resilience” and “adaptive capacity”
interchangeably in this paper. Some key elements of resiliency draw from complex
engineering and ecological systems, such as “safe failure” “redundancy” “flexibility”
and “diversity.” This engineering and ecological emphasis on “maintaining functions
and structures” and “bouncing back” is ubiquitous throughout much adaptation and
resilience literature (James et al., 2015; Moench et al., 2011b; Tanner et al., 2009),
and thus highlights how much of both the climate adaptation and resilience field is
founded on an assumption that returning to the original “status quo” is the goal.
The growing body of climate change adaptation literature is draws heavily
from planning and international development practices, with contributions from the
fields of engineering and hazard risk reduction. Whether focusing on formal or
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informal adaptation actions, the underlying framework of climate change adaptation
literature in development focuses primarily on a technocratic policy and planning
framework. Some authors focus on how to integrate climate science projections, as
well as scientific uncertainty into decision-making on adaptation strategies (Tyler
and Moench, 2012). Other written reports describe how to conduct climate
vulnerability and adaptability assessments and how to create processes that engage
the participation of multiple stakeholders (Moser and Ekstrom, 2011) and facilitate
a process of prioritizing adaptation strategies from among a menu of options with
differing costs, impacts, and benefits across different time scales.
Problems identified in the climate change reports and presentations in
Vietnam are frequently portrayed as primarily physical or managerial problems,
such as flooding, or a lack of education about an issue, that can be solved through
technical solutions, whether through building infrastructure or building the
knowledge, skills, and capacity of local government or community members. In fact,
however, even the most physical manifestations of climate change impacts are
embedded within social relations of power that determine an individual’s sensitivity
and capacity to adapt to any particular stressor.
The supposedly apolitical narrative of many climate adaptation plans
reinforces James Ferguson’s notion of development planning as an “anti-politics
machine” (1994) in which development and climate adaptation projects are
presented as self-standing entities, detached from any social relations of power.
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Given the highly political and contested nature of many of the decisions that need to
be made, it is notable that most climate adaptation literature presents fairly
depoliticized, generalized frameworks and action steps without any discussion of
the specific political and economic context (particularly the political and economic
forces both globally and domestically) which inhibit effective adaptation.
Measuring the success or failure of a climate adaptation strategy is
complicated, since climate impacts may differ over time, and some groups may
benefit from an intervention, while others are harmed. The climate adaptation
literature defines those climate adaptation strategies that increase vulnerability as
“maladaptation” (Adger et al., 2005). In an editorial about maladaptation, the Global
Environmental Change defines five types of maladaptation. In their framework,
maladaptive actions: 1)increase emissions of greenhouse gases, 2)
disproportionately burden the vulnerable, 3) have high opportunity costs (high
economic, social, and environmental costs) comparted to alternative actions; 4)
reduce incentives to adapt, or 5) commit capital and institutions to trajectories that
are difficult to change (path dependency) (“Maladaptation,” 2010, 212). The everpresent risk of maladaptation highlights the challenges of building climate resilience
and adaptive capacity amidst many competing development priorities, primarily
that of economic growth.
In climate adaptation and resilience literature, the theoretical separation
between climate change adaptation/resilience and economic development models is
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clear. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by examining the ways in which
economic development strategies must be an integral part of understanding urban
climate resilience. This thesis examines the contradictions of climate change
adaptation within a growth-oriented economic development agenda and to
reimagine some key components of a comprehensive and critical framework for
urban climate resilience.
To understand the economic forces which are shaping Vietnam’s urban
development, I draw on the literature of Marxian political economy and critical
urban theory. Proponents of neoliberal ideology argue that “open, competitive, and
unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the
optimal mechanism for economic development" (Brenner and Theodore, 2002:
350). Over the last few decades, Vietnam, has embraced global free market
economic integration and an aggressive growth-first economic development
strategy. Although climate change adaptation manuals generally present their
recommendations as politically neutral, this thesis argues that the planning
approaches suggested—and the questions about politics and economics that are left
unasked—reinforce a neoliberal ideology that make it difficult for cities to address
the forces that are driving and increasing climate vulnerability.
Political economists such as David Harvey (1989) have noted that, due to a
variety of factors, including internal crises of capitalism, investors from the Global
North have increasingly looked, since the 1970s, to developing countries in Asia and
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other parts of the Global South for investment opportunities. At the same time, the
failures of agricultural collectivization and centralized state planning in the postwar era of 1975-1985 led the Vietnamese government to begin to dismantle many
agricultural and other collectives, institute some modified property rights, and
embrace a more market-oriented approach to economic development. In order to
join the World Trade Organization in 1997, Vietnam began to reform its stateowned enterprises, increase private investments in state-owned industries, and take
away tariffs and other policies designed to protect Vietnam’s domestic industries.
Vietnam’s accession into WTO and entry into global markets has led to a rapid
growth in exports and economic growth, reinforcing a growth-first development
strategy that depends on continuing to attract foreign investment, through the
creation of supportive legal and tax structures.
Harvey’s concepts of urban entrepreneurialism and inter-urban competition
describe the ways in which cities must increasingly compete against one another,
both within Vietnam and around the world, to attract investments and hold capital
to a particular locale. The concept of urban entrepreneurialism explains the
evolution of urban governance in Vietnam from a more managerial approach in the
pre-1986 era, mostly concerned with the provision of public services to a more
active, risk-bearing approach today to spur economic development (Harvey 1989).
Vietnam’s one-party state control creates a unique aspects to a form of
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“authoritarian neoliberalism,” but Vietnamese cities are subject to the same global
competition to attract and hold capital investment.
The need to attract investment and maintain economic growth influences
Vietnamese local and national government choices in what kinds of infrastructure
projects they choose to build. Jason Hackworth in The Neoliberal City (2006)
examines local municipal financing to highlight how local governments are severely
constrained by their dependence on finance capital to fund their basic infrastructure
and how bond rating agencies, despite their supposedly neutral position, enforce
deeply ideological fiscal practices on urban governments that seeking the low
interest rates which are linked to good bond ratings. In the case of Vietnam, global
financial institutions enforce a similar fiscal discipline that profoundly shapes
Vietnam’s development and infrastructure choices (Hildyard, 2014). A deeper
understanding of how export-oriented growth shapes Vietnamese city development
can help explain why cities act in contradiction to the mandates of climate change
adaptation and the government’s professed goals of poverty reduction.
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Chapter 2: Contradictions Between Urban Infrastructure Development
and Building Climate Resilience in Vietnam
Urban Development Context in Vietnam:
Vietnam’s urban areas have undergone a massive transformation over the
last 30 years. In 1990, the percentage of people living in urban areas was between
less than 18%. By 2016, the urbanized population had grown to 34% of the general
population (World Bank, 2016). Rapid urbanization has outpaced the government’s
ability to provide adequate housing and transportation infrastructure, as is
demonstrated by the congested streets, rising rents, and lack of affordable housing.
A growth-first approach for economic development strategies in Vietnam has led to
rapid and severe environmental degradation, including air pollution, water
pollution, and toxic pollution of soil and freshwater sources.
Rapid urbanization has stretched the capacity of the government to provide
adequate urban infrastructure to provide for its growing urban population. Vietnam
has done “a remarkable job in achieving nearly universal coverage (i.e. 96%) in
access to electricity” (World Bank Urban Brief, April 2012). Other basic urban
services, such as water and sanitation, housing, and transportation, however, lag
behind, creating a host of health and safety problems for urban residents. The Asian
Development Bank (2010) reports that as of 2008, only 10 percent of municipal
wastewater was treated, and in 2010, only 45% of industrial zones were expected to
17

have wastewater treatment of some kind. Inadequate water supply, drainage, and
wastewater systems represent a serious public health and environmental hazard
and the Vietnamese government has leveraged funding to build over eight
wastewater treatment plants in Hanoi and 30 wastewater treatment plants in the
Mekong Delta (Viet Nam News June 2012).
The impacts of insufficient wastewater collection and treatment are
exacerbated by the frequent floods that occur in Vietnam’s cities. In October 2008,
for example, Hanoi experienced five days of steady rainfall, which led to the worst
flood in Hanoi in thirty years (World Bank Urban Brief, 2012). Houses and streets
were submerged, and residents were unable to leave their houses. During this time,
schools were closed for several days, and people were unable to reach the hospital
without a boat. During the flood, the risk of disease outbreaks increased,
demonstrating the severe public health threat posed by the failing sanitation
system.
Amidst these significant urban development challenges, Vietnamese cities
are also facing significant climate change-related impacts. For Vietnamese cities, the
most commonly discussed impacts of climate change relate to increased flooding of
streets and homes, extreme heat events, destructive typhoons, and vector-borne
diseases. Sea level rise and global mean temperature rises are predicted to increase
the severity of flooding and typhoons, droughts, and saltwater intrusion (Chaudhry,
and Ruysschaert, 2007; McElwee, 2010). The IPCC reports that by 2050, sea level
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rise, saltwater intrusion, and flooding could affect up to 7 of the 18 million people
living along the Mekong delta in Vietnam (Brown, 2014). Within this century,
increasing droughts, heat waves, floods, and typhoons threaten to devastate
people’s livelihoods and force millions of Vietnamese to migrate. Although the
Vietnamese government has publicly recognized these threats and embarked on a
climate adaptation strategy over ten years ago, Vietnamese cities’ development
plans and economic strategies often undermine and contradict their climate
adaptation goals.
The National Strategy on Climate Change from 2011, mandates that all cities
develop climate change adaptation plans, conduct climate change risk assessments
and integrate those climate risk assessments into local urban development planning
(Tyler 2017). Yet despite the many national and local climate change adaptation
plans in Vietnam, critical estuarine, wetland, and floodplain areas are still being
destroyed to make room for rapid urban growth and industrial development.
Transportation infrastructure, industrial zone development, and energy
infrastructure are high priorities for the Vietnamese government. In my interviews
with Vietnamese government officials and planners, the construction of roads,
highways, housing developments, and industrial zones are seen as essential
prerequisites for economic growth and represent key aspects of what it means to be
a developed country (personal interviews, 2017).
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Summary of Interview Findings
In my interviews with Vietnamese government officials and planners, my
interview subjects acknowledged the frequent contradictions between economic
development and climate adaptation strategies. Although they agreed that economic
development is generally prioritized, my interview subjects also had a good
understanding of how high temperature extremes, flooding, and other climate
impacts would detrimentally impact city residents. They described numerous
examples of urban development projects that directly contradict a city’s climate
adaptation goals—from residential and industrial developments that were built on
floodplains to industrial parks that destroyed former mangrove forests.
To explain why these maladaptive projects were implemented, planners
generally came up with four general explanations. First, some explained that
government planners often lack an understanding of localized climate change
impacts. Secondly, they argued that many government bureaus and ministries had a
faulty planning culture—citing a lack of coordination and the tendency to work in
siloes as a key explanation for why projects would contradict the very climate
resilience goals espoused by the city and country. Thirdly, many NGO workers talked
about how the Vietnamese government planners and officials often fail to consult
local communities who are most impacted by the projects, which thus leads to
outcomes that increase vulnerability, particularly among poor and marginalized
communities. Lastly, my interview subjects lifted up the lack of government
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accountability, widespread corruption, lack of transparency, as key governance
issues that lead to maladaptive development projects.
Although all of these explanations have merit, notably none of my participants
articulated a larger systemic critique of the underlying economic growth model as a
key factor leading to these maladaptive projects. Most of them decried the narrow
focus on economic value over social and environmental values, as well as the
prioritization of short-term profit over long-term value. Yet, most expressed a belief
that a more comprehensive approach that balanced social equity, environmental
protection, and economic development would enable development projects that built
climate resilience while promoting economic development. In this thesis, I delve more
deeply into the economic forces which are leading to the maladaptive outcomes.
In this section, I look at three examples of urban and industrial development
projects that directly contradict Vietnam’s climate change adaptation goals in order
to understand the ways in which infrastructure development and residential
development practices can undermine climate resilience and make residents more
vulnerable to the severe climate. The purpose of this section is not necessarily to
delve into the technical details of each project, or to highlight the particular areas of
improvement, but rather to give a snapshot view of the ways in which common
urban development projects are frequently at odds with climate change adaptation
goals. This thesis explores how the underlying economic paradigm of these projects
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lead inevitably to contradictory outcomes for cities attempting to both grow their
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as well as build climate resilience.
Industrial Zone construction: Thai Binh Economic Zone
Industrial zones are a key component of export-led development, since they
facilitate foreign direct investment. Local city governments compete for investment
by building industrial parks or zones that bring together needed infrastructure, such
as water and wastewater treatment, access to electricity, easy transport to shipping
centers, and a steady pool of labor. Many industrial parks are purposefully sited
near major roads that lead to airports, seaports, and rail stations for convenient
shipping. The Vietnamese government usually establishes financial incentives, such
as reduced tax rates or other subsidies to encourage companies to choose their
cities as locations to invest.
The northern province of Thai Binh lies about 110 km from Hanoi. As a
coastal province, it faces recurring storms and typhoons that are projected to grow
increasingly destructive as global temperatures rise. Starting in the mid-1980s, local
villagers and the provincial government embarked on planting and restoring the
coastal mangrove forests after a heavy storm in 1986 swept in powerful tides,
destroyed the dike and flooded the village (Binh 2017). “The forest has since
become a golden shield for thousands of households against storms,” a local
resident told Tuoi Tre newspaper (2017).
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Recently, however, 320 hectares of the mangrove forests are slated to be
destroyed to make way for a new industrial zone. On January 3, 2018, the Prime
Minister announced the establishment of a new Thai Binh Economic Zone, which
will cover 31,000 hectares. Like other economic zones in Vietnam, the TBEZ will
offer tax breaks, subsidies, and other economic incentives to attract companies to
locate within the zone (Nhan Dan 2018). Nationally, a preferential corporate income
tax rate of 10% has been set for a 15-year period for new investments in economic
and high-tech zones.
Given that mangrove forests protect against climate change impacts such as
rising sea levels, and more intense storms typhoons, the destruction of these
mangrove forests to build industrial zones obviously undermines Thai Binh coastal
village’s climate resilience. As recently as 2016, Thai Binh province renewed its
commitment to planting 1,320 more hectares of mangrove forest in recognition of
the important role that the forest plays in supporting people’s agricultural, seafood,
and aquaculture livelihoods. In February of 2017, the Minister of the Environment
visited Thai Binh province in celebration of World Wetlands Day, and the entire
320-hectare plot of mangrove forest to be used for the industrial zone lies
completely within the bounds of the Red River Biosphere Reserve (Tuoi Tre, 2017).
Even the nominal environmental impact assessment, noted that clearing
mangrove forests would “allow seawater to reach the mainland and destroy local
dike systems and aquatic farms in the event of strong storms” (Tuoi Tre, 2017). The
environmental impact assessment process itself was criticized for failing to
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community members. Journalists noted that although the developer held two
separate meetings for public feedback, only local leaders were invited, not
community members who would be impacted the most, such as the 354 aquatic
farming households and other residents whose livelihoods depend on having a
strong protective mangrove forest (Tuoi Tre, 2017). Despite this absence of public
participation, the industrial zone project was approved in January of 2018. The Thai
Binh industrial zone project represents the contradictions between and within local
and national government agencies, in seeking to both protect their mangrove forests
and aquatic-based industries, while also expanding their industrial development
and investments.

Road Infrastructure: Danang and Quy Nhon
Given the emphasis on attracting outside investment in industries, the
Vietnamese government has also prioritized the expansion of its road infrastructure.
According to the World Bank, less than half of the country’s roads are paved (World
Bank’s Trading Economics website), and the Vietnamese government estimates that
the cost of building the necessary highways to connect industrial and manufacturing
hubs to ports and other cities ranges in the billions of dollars (Lam, 2017).
With a population of 1.4 million, Danang is the third largest city in Vietnam,
located in central Vietnam. It is one of only five cities in Vietnam with a Level 1
ranking, meaning that its city government has more autonomy and is not under the
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authority of a higher-level provincial government (Tran et al., 2017). Rapid urban
growth in Danang has led to new development in the southernmost areas of the city,
such as Hoa Tien commune (Singh et al., 2015). In order to serve the newly
urbanized areas of the city, the city of Danang built a new road through Hoa Tien
commune, with primary funding provided by the Asian Development Bank (Tran et
al., 2017). Called the “ADB5 Road” by local residents, the road was built 2.5 meters
higher than surrounding areas. Although elevated road construction above seasonal
flood levels might be seen as a precautionary climate adaptation strategy, these
actions also bring unintended consequences for surrounding areas. A study by the
Institute for Social and Environmental Transition found that expanded road
construction, residential developments, industrial zones, and even wastewater
treatment plans are filling in floodplain areas and exacerbating flooding. The report
authors write “The construction of ring roads to service the city has added to
existing hazards by obstructing the water’s natural pathways and directing it to the
new residential area and beyond, causing harsher flooding in neighboring wards”
(Singh et al., 2015).
As demand for developable land grows, the city of Danang is trucking in soil
from nearby mountains to fill in floodplains for development of residential,
commercial, and industrial projects. These new developments, like the new roads,
are usually built at a higher elevation to prevent the flooding, but in trying to protect
some residents, others who live outside the protected areas have to suffer from
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higher flood waters.
In the city of Quy Nhon, ISET researchers Michael DiGregorio and Van Cao
Huynh (2012) studied the extreme flooding that occurred after Typhoon Mirinae in
2009, which killed 22 people. The researchers noted that although the rainfall in
Quy Nhon was not particularly heavy, the new highway construction, as well as new
industrial and residential infill projects had transformed the floodplain area,
blocking the flow of water into the Thi Nai Lagoon, which serves as the outlet for the
many upstream rivers and streams that flow through Quy Nhon. In their study, they
found that while climate change is projected to change precipitation levels, in fact
recent urban development played a much larger role in creating the extreme, and in
this case fatal, flooding. Digregorio and Huynh note that in the period after
liberation in 1975, the water management system accommodated the natural cycles
of flooding and tides, recognizing the value that floods played in supporting the
then-agricultural area. However, this water management system changed as the
area became increasingly urbanized in the late 1990s. “From an urban perspective,
flooding is a risk associated with the destruction of economic value measured in
property, labor, and financial capital,” they explain. “Unlike farmers, who perceive
benefits in normal seasonal flooding, urban property owners see only threats”
(DiGregorio and Huynh, 2012). Urban construction and road development, often
prioritize the needs of urban projects over the needs of agricultural farmers.

26

The new master plans for Quy Nhon include construction of dikes for flood
protection, yet dikes cannot prevent flooding--they can only serve by displacing
flooding to other areas. Thus, the researchers posit that the incremental expansion
of flood prevention infrastructure—from elevated roads to dikes —will ultimately
undermine the expressed goal. Digregorio and Huynh predict:
If the master plans and project plans for Quy Nhon are carried out, the
next flood is likely to result in new calls for flood prevention
infrastructure in Dieu Tri, Tuy Phuoc, southern Nhon Phu, Tran Quang
Dieu, and Phuoc My. In this way, the incremental process will continue
upstream until the entire lower and middle levels of the river are
diked. Eventually, the floodways will be so constrained that the
protective dike system itself will be overcome (2012).
As demonstrated in these road infrastructure examples from both Danang and Quy
Nhon, flooding is not merely some biophysical force to be modeled and planned for.
Rather, flooding interacts with the changing human-built environment, which is
shaped by political priorities and power relations.
Energy Infrastructure: Long Phu 1 Coal-Fired Power Plant
In the less than thirty years, Vietnam has moved from being one of the
poorest countries in the world in the 1991 to being a middle-income country today.
Vietnam’s investments in its energy infrastructure have played a key role in
supporting its rapid economic development. As the Vietnam Energy Outlook Report
2017 declares, “Economic growth requires secure and affordable supply of energy
to all of the society participants and economic sectors.” The Vietnamese rapid
expansion of energy infrastructure in Vietnam has yielded impressive results. In
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1998, only half of Vietnam had access to electricity, while today almost the entire
country has access to electricity, which has laid the foundation for Vietnam’s
emergence as new manufacturing hub in Asia (Lam, 2017).
With new factories opening up and rising consumer spending on a multitude
of electrical appliances, Vietnam’s electrical demand is growing 11% every year,
about double the annual GDP growth rate (Williams, 2017). To meet skyrocketing
energy demand, Vietnam is increasingly turning to coal. From 2000 to 2015, the
share of renewable energy, mostly hydropower and biomass energy, dropped from
over half (53%) to less than a quarter (24%) of total energy supply (Danish Energy
Agency, 2017). During this same period, the coal usage grew from 15% to 35% of
total supply. It is projected that by 2020, coal will replace hydropower as the main
source of electricity generation, and that by 2030, coal-fired plants will generate
more than half of the country’s total electricity (V. P. Nguyen, 2017).
Vietnam’s dependence on coal is already harming its citizens’ health, and is
projected to lead to almost 20,000 excess deaths per year by 2030 due to air
pollution, a fivefold increase from the calculated number in 2011 (4,252 deaths). By
2030, Vietnam will be the country most affected by coal pollution in all of Southeast
Asia, with 188.8 excess deaths per million people (Nguyen, 2017). For comparison,
the calculated number for the second most affected country in the Southeast Asia,
Indonesia, is 85.4 excess deaths per million people. Traffic accidents, the number
one cause of unnatural deaths in Vietnam today, cause about 106 excess deaths per
million people from 2012-2017. Despite these stark statistics and growing protests
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from the citizens who are suffering from coal pollution, economic planners feel that
Vietnam has few choices, if it wants to continue its growth-oriented development
path.
Long Phu 1 is the first of three coal-fired power stations planned as part of
the Long Phu Power Center, located in Soc Trang province in the Mekong River
Delta, about 230 km outside of Ho Chi Minh City. Financed by a variety of public and
private financial institutions, including various export credit agencies in Europe, as
well as the Russian development bank Vnesheconombank, the coal plant is expected
to cost about $1.9 billion (Market Forces website, 2018). Once completed, Long Phu
1 will burn imported coal for Australia and Indonesia and is projected to generate
1200 MW of energy and 5.4 million tons of carbon dioxide a year (DeAngelis, 2018).
International environmental organizations and advocacy groups argue that
the environmental impact assessment underreports carbon emissions, and that
even the false emissions reports violate standards set forth by the OECD for coal
financing by export credit agencies, which are the largest source of public financing
for coal plants (Ives, 2018). Likewise, private financial institutions, including
Citibank, UK Export Finance, and Wells Fargo, have agreed to the Equator Principles
which similarly set forth guidelines to ensure that large development and
infrastructure projects consider environmental and social impacts in the process of
funding approval (Tatarski, 2018). In its June 2017 report “Failure to Comply,”
Friends of the Earth International reported how the Long Phu 1 violates both the
OECD standards and the Equator Principles that most of the public and private
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banks have adopted with respect to financing coal projects. First, they note that
despite claims by the project developers, the plant uses a dirtier “supercritical”
technology and not “ultra-supercritical” technology1. Secondly, they note that the
environmental and social impact statements were faulty. Thirdly, the project
sponsors “will not be able to demonstrate that less carbon intensive alternatives are
not possible,” which is part of the OECD guidelines. And lastly, they note that the
project is in direct contradiction to Vietnam’s national energy policy, which states an
explicit goal of expanding renewable energy infrastructure and investments
(DeAngelis 2018).
In addition to the long-term climate impacts from coal plant emissions, many
Vietnamese citizens are starting to voice their opposition to the air pollution and
resulting health ailments that these coal-fired power plants bring to surrounding
communities. In April 2015, thousands of residents of the southeastern village of
Vinh Tan in Binh Thuan province gathered to block National Highway 1 for 30 hours
after dust from the nearby Vinh Tan coal power plant covered their homes. The coal
ash hit around 1,370 households in the Vinh Tan commune and many residents of
Vinh Tan reported developing respiratory diseases since coal plant came into
operation (Nam, 2015). Nationwide, coal-fired power plants use about 20 million

Super-critical technology, with a thermal efficiency of around 42%, is more efficient than
subcritical coal technology, which has a thermal efficiency of around 38%. Ultra-supercritical
technology has a 44-47% thermal efficiency. Ultra-supercritical technology is associated with
14% lower sulphur dioxide and other emissions than sub-critical technology. (Mylliyvirta, 2017)
1
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tons of coal per year and discharge about three million tons of coal ash, the disposal
of which has created further toxic pollution in land and waterways (Nam, 2015).
The Long Phu 1 coal-fired power plant project exemplifies the glaring
contradictions between Vietnam’s stated Paris Climate Accord goals, and its
economic development goals.
Upon hearing that Vietnam had confirmed plans to build another 40 gigawatts
worth of coal-fired power plants, the equivalent of about 40 nuclear power plants,
World Bank president Jim Yong Kim told a group of world leaders in unscripted
remarks that “If Vietnam goes forward with 40GW of coal, if the entire region
implements the coal-based plans right now, I think we are finished. That would spell
disaster for us and our planet.” (Goldenberg 2016).
Although it was perhaps a surprise to the Vietnamese government to learn
that their energy choices have such an impact on global climate change, Kim’s
assertion is corroborated by climate scientists who have essentially said that coal
power needs to be quickly phased out by 2050, if the world is to meet its agreed goal
of keeping global warming to less than 2ºC, which is a politically-determined
threshold in which climate change impacts which are perceived as “dangerous” and
the potential for runaway climate change through positive feedback loops increases
(Plumer 2014). Since coal-fired power plants can take up to a decade to build,
Vietnam’s plans to build Long Phu 1 and to add about 40 Gigawatts of coal-fired
power by 2030 will definitively lock Vietnam into dirty coal power generation well
past 2050, the date at which scientists have said that coal use must have ceased to
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avoid more than a one-meter sea level rise, which would force millions of
Vietnamese to migrate from parts of the Mekong River Delta and other low-lying
coastal regions (Brown, 2014).
Yet nowhere in Vietnam’s many climate adaptation plans, is the halting of
coal-fired power plants mentioned. Climate adaptation literature considers actions
that reduce greenhouse gases to be “climate mitigation” which is a separate
category of planning and action. This false separation between climate adaptation
and climate mitigation strategies allows and contributes to contradictory energy
development plans and climate change adaptation plans that are at odds with one
another.
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Chapter 3: Interviewees’ Four Main Explanations for Maladaptation
My interviewees offered four general categories of explanations for why
cities are failing to properly build adaptive capacity, in spite of their climate
adaptation plans and goals.
1) Lack of information about climate change
The first could be broadly called the “lack of information” theory, in which
many planners believe that city officials lack accurate climate data about climate
impacts at the local scale. In addition, To begin with, my interviewees explained,
some local government officials do not fully understand how climate change will
impact or is already impacting their particular community (personal interviews,
2017). Indeed, my interviews did reveal some lack of understanding of climate
impacts. Several officials in Hanoi, where many of my interviews took place, argued
that climate change impacts were less clear in Northern Vietnam, because Northern
Vietnamese cities didn’t have the same geography as the low-lying Mekong River
Delta, nor did it suffer from as many typhoons as Central Vietnam. I heard this
assessment several times, and does reflect a common misunderstanding that the
impacts of climate change are limited to the biophysical impacts of climate change
that occur within the boundaries of a particular city or province or country. This
misunderstanding does reflect a lack of information about how climate change can
trigger impacts on industrial and agricultural supply chains and human migration
patterns that reach far beyond the borders of a particular city.
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In addition, people pointed to lack of resources to gather accurate localized
information. For example, planners at the Department of Natural Resources and
Environment in Ho Chi Minh City pointed out the need to “invest in upgrading the
water quality monitoring system” as a key adaptation priority, which would allow
them to make more informed decisions about saline water intrusion and water
pollution (UN-HABITAT, 2012). The ranges of uncertainty which are inherent to
projections of increased rainfall or temperatures also made it difficult for planners
to incorporate climate projections into their plans. In this first causal explanation,
the problem can be solved through prioritizing education and capacity-building to
help planners deal with uncertainty and develop more robust plans that can adapt
to a range of climate scenarios. Many foundations and development agencies have
prioritized this kind of education and capacity-building, as well as investing in
better climate data collection and monitoring systems and more effectively
disseminating climate data to planners (Nguyen et al., 2014). And the relative lack of
financial resources can be solved by increased investment by donor and financial
institutions, which can in turn be used to support necessary investments in both
hard infrastructure, and in governmental capacity-building.
2) Uncoordinated planning processes
My interview participants also offered a second general theory for
maladaptive development projects which focused on uncoordinated planning
processes, including lack of communication and coordination between cities and
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agencies. For example, they described instances in which the Department of
Construction or the Department of Transport, for example, approves development
and construction on an area that has been mapped by the Department of Natural
Resources and Environment to be a floodplain. Likewise, many climate change
impacts, such as flooding are exacerbated by the lack of regional coordination
between provinces. For example, hydropower dams upstream may be controlled by
different agencies and be in a different jurisdiction than the downstream towns and
cities which experience the impacts from the water flows. Hydropower authorities
have an economic incentive to operate at full capacity, which makes it challenging
for them to reduce reservoir levels when rainfall is uncertain (Tran and Tran, 2015).
Thus, when unexpected heavy rainfall occurs, the dam operators often are forced to
release large amounts of water at exactly the time when downstream areas are
already experiencing flooding due to heavy rains. The construction of new
residential, commercial and industrial developments inevitably leads to impacts
elsewhere, as floodplain areas filled and water is redirected to lower-lying areas.
To address this uncoordinated development, climate adaptation
practitioners recommend: more coordination between cities, the development of
regional plans so cities can coordinate with other cities, and mechanisms for
integrating flood and drainage information into various construction and
development plans (Moench et al., 2011a; Tran and Tran, 2015). In 2017, the
Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment an integrated inter-sectoral
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planning law, which was adopted by the National Assembly in November of 2017
(Nhan Dan, 2017). However, one of my interviewees cautioned:
If the National Assembly approves this law, it is a good step, but
implementing it will be challenging. The Ministry of Construction and
other ministries seem to not want the plan, because they may lose
their funding, with their own budget, and control over their plan.
(personal interview, 2017).
As his comment highlights, mandating increased coordination does not mean that
the departments and ministries will change their practices, given their own selfinterests. Increased coordination requires training and the development of new
processes to enable city departments and jurisdictions to coordinate and implement
plans. Regional coordination along bioregions and watershed regions, requires the
creation of new institutional structures such as river basin management
organizations, which cross existing jurisdictional boundaries, and may threaten
existing spheres of power, funding, and decision-making.
3) Lack of public consultation and participation
Vietnam’s Constitution and political culture prioritizes public participation
in decision-making. Two familiar slogans in Vietnam that reflect this participatory
emphasis are: “People know, people discuss, people do, and people monitor” and
“Government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Nguyen, 2009).
Vietnam has a wide array of mass organizations which serve to facilitate public
involvement in civic life, such as the Vietnam Women’s Union, the Farmers’ Union,
the Youth Union, and trade unions. Participation in mass organizations does not,
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however, mean that people are regularly engaged in land use and development
decisions (Wells-Dang et al., 2015). My interview participants acknowledged that
the top-down planning culture in Vietnam leads to development projects that
frequently do not engage the communities most impacted, and that thus frequently
increase certain communities’ vulnerability. For example, Toan Vu, a Technical
Consultant with ISET explains:
Finding successful climate change adaptation examples is not easy. Vietnam
has invested a lot of money in climate adaptation projects, for example, the
mangrove projects. But if you don’t involve local people in the project, even if
it creates 10-100 hectares of mangrove, if you don’t engage people and
address their livelihoods, it’s not successful. (personal interview, 2017)
Vu described one project in Thanh Hoa province in which the government engaged
“experts on mangrove plantations,” without the participation and decision-making
of the poor fisherpeople and shrimp farmers living along the coast. Because they did
not involve the local residents, the planners failed to consider how residents would
generate income during the early years of the mangrove plantation development.
Furthermore, because the local residents were not involved in the project, the
organizers were not able to effectively engage them in maintaining the mangrove
forests after they were planted (personal interview, 2017).
All three of the infrastructure examples that I highlighted earlier, including
the Thai Binh industrial zone project, the Danang and Quy Nhon road and highway
projects, and the Long Phu 1 coal-fired power plant projects, were critiqued for the
lack of public consultation in the decision-making process. For example, in the case
of Can Tho city, a researcher from the Vietnam-Japan University explained that
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government planners can frequently circumvent requirements for public
consultation by purposefully not engaging the proper stakeholders. “For example, if
Can Tho [city] wants to sell the land and rezone it, they will have the public meeting
required, but they will invite the wrong person to come,” he explained in his
interview. Likewise although Vietnam does require environmental impact
assessments, my research revealed that interviewees generally did not believe that,
in the face of extreme pressure, many planners carried out environmental impact
assessments that were not rigorous or accurate.
4) Governance issues: Accountability and corruption
Lastly, my interviewees pointed to government corruption and a lack of
accountability as another key factor in driving maladaptive and harmful
development projects. As a one-party state, Vietnam has an executive, legislative,
and judiciary branch controlled by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Mass
organizations such as the Women’s Union, Youth Union, and the General
Confederation of Labor, are tightly connected to the government and the party
(Thayer, 2008). In the post-Doi Moi period, the government has attempted to
strengthen its electoral processes, but its elections are still carefully controlled
(Thayer, 2008). According to several interviewees, local leaders are frequently
more concerned with impressing their superiors who appointed them, rather than
to the local residents whom they ostensibly lead (personal interview, 2017).
Moreover, the five-year cycle of leadership encourages a short-term focus, since
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leaders are frequently appointed to new positions every five years. One NGO
workers explained:
Each official has four to five years, and they want to have some big
projects during their mandate. It’s the thing people will look at to
evaluate. “I did three or four big projects.” Usually the impacts come
later. But their higher ranking bosses, look at it as an indicator that
someone is doing a good job or bad job (personal interview, 2017).
The appointments and relatively short terms of office create an incentive to produce
immediate achievements within five years, even if the long-term costs of the project,
particularly with respect to future climate change impacts, may be detrimental. The
lack of accountability to local constituents means that many communities have little
voice in shaping the infrastructure development projects that directly affect their
communities and livelihoods.
Many of my interviewees described a focus on short-term economic gain,
even at the expense of long-term costs. In contrast to the popular conception of
government corruption as an individual gaining large amounts of money illegally,
Nicholas Hildyard (2016) argues that there are many common practices, such as a
revolving door between private industry and public office, which while not overtly
illegal, do represent a corruption of the government’s ostensible purpose to protect
the common good. A climate change researcher at Vietnam-Japan University points
out that although the urban design and planning process is frequently carried out by
consultants working with the provincial government. “Most of the planners are on
the side of the private sector,” he explains. “They just want to buy land and sell the
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house—they don’t care about the temperature increase, sea level rise, or flooding.
They just want to know how much money they can get, and once they get money,
they can move on” (personal interview, 2017). In the interview, he described how
the private sector companies were driving the planning and development of cities,
often in direct contradiction to the cities’ master plans. His responses suggest that
the local government’s deference to capital and relative lack of capacity renders
local planners unable to effectively regulate urban development.
Although there is truth to all of these theories with regard to the lack of
information and various failures and challenges of the planning process and lack of
accountability, in this paper I propose a different explanation. I argue that in fact,
the recurring maladaptive actions and projects are inherent in the economic
development model that Vietnam has chosen, and that even with more information,
better coordination, more participatory planning processes, and even more
democratic governance, the inevitable contradictions between growth-oriented
economic development and climate resilience would still be happening. By focusing
so narrowly on better climate hazard and risk information and stronger planning
processes, climate change adaptation scholars and practitioners tacitly suggest,
through omission, rather than overt declaration, that climate change adaptation can
be tackled without challenging power relations or the existing economic system and
development model. In the next section, I explore the ways in which the political
economy of Vietnam—from its economic development strategies, dependency on
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international finance, and structural reforms—shape climate change resilience
outcomes.
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Chapter 4: Political Economy of Vietnam: Fr om Plan to Market
In order to understand why urban development is going in opposite direction
from climate adaptation plans, we need to understand the history, governance, and
political economy of Vietnam, issues which are noticeably absent in climate
adaptation literature. Over the past twenty years, Vietnam has engaged in a gradual
transition from a socialist state-planned economy to a more market-oriented
capitalist economy. For several decades during and after its wars for national
independence (from 1950s-1986 in the North, and from 1975-1986 in the South),
Vietnam was organized by a centralized state-planned economy. With agricultural
collectivization, markets were abolished during this time, and a rationing system
distributed food, cloth, and other essential items. This period of strict state planning
and rationing is known as the Subsidy Period (thời bao cấp). The collectivization of
agriculture, combined with a U.S. embargo, led to decreased agricultural production
and widespread hunger (Pham, Trinh, and Nguyen 2007). Popular memory and
discourse describes these years as a period of tremendous scarcity and hardship.
In 1986, Vietnam, announced its Dỏi Mới (Renovation) policy, which
announced a shift towards a more market-oriented economy. Subsequently,
agricultural collectives were ended, and individual households were allowed to farm
their own plots of land again, which turned Vietnam from a new importer to a net
exporter of rice. The rationing system was abolished, and private businesses were

42

allowed. The market reforms, as well as the normalization of trade relations with
the United States led to a period of impressive economic growth.
Vietnam has explicitly chosen an export-led, foreign investment-dependent
development model as a path out of poverty for its people. In many ways, this
export-oriented growth model has been wildly successful. Over the past three
decades, from the 1990s to the present, Vietnam transformed itself from one of the
poorest countries in the world, to now a lower middle-income country. Vietnam’s
economic growth rate ranged between 7-8% from 2003-2007, and now is hovering
between 5 and 7% from 2008-2016, far outperforming most other countries. The
poverty rate has fallen from an astounding 58% in 1993 to 14.5% in 2010. (World
Bank website, “Vietnam Overview”). In light of these impressive results, the World
Bank has declared Vietnam “a development success story.” (World Bank website,
“Vietnam Overview”).
The World Bank notes that between 1993 and 2012 the average income of
the bottom 40% in Vietnam grew at an annual rate of 9 percent. Although they
praise this as “one of the highest rates of growth for the bottom 40% in the world,”
they fail to mention the much larger rates of growth for middle and upper income
Vietnamese, particularly the very wealthiest Vietnamese. Today, Vietnam’s 210
super-rich earn more than enough in one year to lift 3.2 million people out of
poverty and end extreme poverty in Vietnam (Oxfam 2017). This economic
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inequality undermines the poverty reduction goals that the Vietnamese government
has set.
Vietnam is not unique in this growing inequality, which has grown in parallel
with the liberalization of its economy. Indeed, the transcendence of neoliberal
ideology has led nation-states around the world to steadily, and often rapidly, move
away from state regulation and intervention towards more international free
market economies over the last 40 years. In Vietnam, however, the one-party rule by
the Vietnamese Communist Party does lend unique attributes to its economic
restructuring. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) use the term “actually
existing neoliberalism” to emphasize that neoliberal restructuring operates
differently in each place, adapting the “pre-existing uses of space, institutional
configurations, and constellations of sociopolitical power” (361). Vietnam’s decadeslong history of one-party state planning and governance has profoundly shaped the
political and regulatory context in which its now market-led restructuring is taking
place. As Vietnam has become increasingly integrated into the global economy over
the last twenty-five years, its economy has likewise been transformed through
neoliberal restructuring, including the privatization of parts of its state-owned
enterprise sector, as well as the liberalization of its trade both within Vietnam and
with other countries.
Despite the economic changes and rapid integration into the global economy,
Vietnam’s institutions, culture, and practices create a unique brand of neoliberalism,

44

which Bob Jessop (2002) would call “neostatism,” in which the state plays a more
active interventionist role to promotes the integration of Vietnam into the capitalist
global economy. Ultimately, there is no such country or place practicing what might
be considered “true” or “pure” neoliberalism. The neoliberal project itself is rather a
contradictory process, full of advances and regressions, new additions and
adaptations to local political forces. Thus Peck and Tickell (2003) use the term
“neoliberalisation” to convey that rather than a permanent condition,
neoliberalization is a continuing and always-contested process between local
institutions, agents of resistance, and institutional legacies. In Vietnam, the 1990s
and early 2000s represented an early stage of neoliberalisation, which they call
“Roll-back” neoliberalism. In this phase of reaction, the many facets that represent
the older interventionist welfare state are significantly scaled back and attacked,
both rhetorically and concretely. In this phase, public services are privatized, labor
protections may be shifted to give capital more power, the financial sector is often
deregulated, and taxes are often cut in the name of increasing economic growth.
After the destruction of the Keynesian state, Peck and Tickell describe the next
phase as a more proactive phase of “Rollout neoliberalism” in which involves the
construction of new institutions and structures to consolidate the new neoliberal
regime (2003 p 163). In Vietnam, the destruction of the socialist state does not
necessarily entail the destruction of the Communist Party nor does it mean the end
of one-party rule, but it does mean a fundamental transformation of the purpose of
the Party and government apparatus. Rather than the prior socialist focus on the
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provision of services and redistribution of wealth, the Communist Party under
market liberalization instead focuses on creating new regulatory and policy
frameworks that support and facilitate neoliberalized state forms and modes of
governance, in which public services and assets are increasingly transferred to the
private sector to manage and profit from. The state plays a leading role in economic
and social restructuring, including public-private partnerships under state guidance,
and a move towards regulated competition rather than overt state control. In this
way, despite the continuing presence of the government agencies in urban
development, Vietnam’s market-oriented reforms represent strategies that advance,
rather than challenge, private profit-driven interests. In the next section, I explore
the dominant narratives of economic development and progress which justify the
growth-at-any cost development model.

Storylines of Economic Development and “Catching Up”
An understanding of Vietnam’s dominant narrative of development is
key to understanding how climate change adaptation is conceived and
implemented in Vietnam. In several informal conversations, people
referenced the idea that Vietnam is “x number of years behind” various
developed countries like the US. Therefore, the dominant storyline of
Vietnam conceptualizes development as a linear progression with some
countries “further behind” Vietnam and other countries “ahead of” Vietnam,
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as in Japan, the US, and European countries. Increasing wealth, as measured
by Gross Domestic Product, as wealth as outward signifiers of wealth, such as
number of millionaires, also symbolized some sort of progress (personal
interviews, 2017). For example, when asked about his vision of a developed
Vietnam, one official from the Urban Development Management Division of
the Ministry of Construction, replied:
If we can develop like Thailand, or like Malaysia, within the next 50
years, that would be my own vision. Vietnam should be another
Malaysia in the next 40-50 years (personal interview, 2017).
This linear conceptualization and version of history reinforces the belief that “there
is no alternative” to integrating into the global free market, as former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher once famously declared. Thus, the only question
becomes how much should the government privatize and how quickly should be the
pace of market reforms? It effectively dismisses any discussion about what kind of
development needs to take place, since obviously in a linear progression, it’s only
forward or backward.
My interviews revealed a general sense of pride in how quickly Vietnam had
moved into lower middle-income status. In general, economic trade liberalization
and integration into the global economy was seen as part of a larger process of
Vietnam joining an advanced global society. In fact, in many ways, I heard economic
reforms consistently conflated with political reforms, implying that any actions that
devolved power away from the one-party state, were in some way connected to
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more liberal political reforms, such as increased freedom of speech or more
democratic governance. Erik Harms describes a similar conflation of political and
market-based freedoms in Luxury and Rubble: Civility and Dispossession in the New
Saigon (2016):
After many years of socialism, when all property was nationalized,
this is why so many Vietnamese people consider the return of private
property—officially understood as the right to transfer “land use
rights”—as a stepping stone on the pathway to increased freedom.
(Kindle location 5025 of 7048)
This sense of globalization as a civilizing process and a sign of progress, was a
recurring theme in conversations with both officials and ordinary people on the
street.
Overwhelmingly, my interviewees expressed great hope in Vietnam’s steady
integration into the global economy. One of the top leaders at the Academy for the
Construction of Cities, a training arm within the Ministry of Construction, which
trains managers throughout the country, stated “The younger generation will study
abroad and become global citizens. They’ll take the lessons and progress of the
world, and create new ways of thinking” (personal interview, 2017). In statements
similar to this, I heard my interviewees express a hope that the younger generation
in Vietnam, whose increasing ability to speak English, access the internet, and study
abroad, would be able to help Vietnam “catch up” to many more “advanced”
countries such as Korea or Japan.
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In my interviews, the popular narrative about Vietnam’s economic
development went something like this: The years under a state-planned economy
as years of tremendous suffering, hunger, and hardship, and generally agreed that
the economic stagnation of the period indicated a fundamental flaw of a stateplanned economy. Forced to change course, in 1986, the Communist government
announced the policy of Dỏi Mới, or Renovation, in which the government
announced it would begin to reduce government controls and allow free markets to
operate. The reform process was slow to start, but as the Vietnamese government
has loosened controls and joined the global market economy, Vietnam has
developed quickly, and people are much better off today. In this popular narrative,
the destruction of coastal and wetland ecosystems, massive deforestation, urban
sprawl, and loss of farmland and biodiversity, are regrettable, yet justifiable under
the current master narrative that this is an unfortunate phase that Vietnam must
pass through in order to ‘catch up’ with the rest of the world in terms of economic
development.
The globally hegemonic storyline of development as economic growth has a
powerful influence on Vietnam’s own vision for its development. In its publicly
stated strategic plans and goals, Vietnam has put forth ambitious urban
development goals, influenced by the image of development from the models it sees
in the Global North. For example, one presentation from the Ministry of
Construction declares a government goal to reach 70% urbanization by 2050. The
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reasoning, according to this presentation, is that this urbanization ratio would then
make Vietnam’s ratio “equal to developed countries.” (Ministry of Construction
presentation, 2011). The logic seems easy to understand: If Vietnam wants to aim to
be a developed country, it should therefore aim to have an urban/rural population
ratio that is similar to that of developed countries. This dominant narrative of
Vietnam “catching up” with the rest of the developed world hugely shapes Vietnam’s
approach to development and climate change adaptation.
Jason Hackworth (2006) describes “the discursive naturalization of
neoliberalism” in which “neoliberalism gets transformed from a political moment
into something that is natural, democratically chosen, or completely predictable.”
Currently, the dominant discourse in Vietnam also suggests that there is a general
consensus that governments are less efficient and effective than the private sector.
This discursive naturalization of neoliberalism is also assumed in climate change
adaptation approaches by international financial and development institutions, and
necessarily limits the range of policy options that are presented.
The consistently high GDP growth rate within Vietnam over the past thirty
years and the rapid reduction in poverty rates seem to be concrete evidence of the
superiority of the market liberalization strategy. Indeed, the liberalization of the
economy does seem to have unleashed tremendous entrepreneurial energy in
Vietnam (Kim, 2008). After decades of being excluded from the global economy
through wars and sanctions, a common perception is that Vietnam, by opening up to
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global investment and joining the World Trade Organization in 2007, is “catching up
with the rest of the world.” But this narrative ignores the larger political and
economic forces which shaped economic outcomes in Vietnam.
The US sanctions against Vietnam (starting in 1951 in North Vietnam and
going from 1975-1994 for all of Vietnam, after the 1975 reunification) cut Vietnam
off from trade, investment, and loans from not just U.S.-based firms and banks, but
also from firms and banks in other countries, who were pressured by the U.S. to
honor the U.S. embargo (Fallows 44). Because of the US influence, the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank also were prevented
from giving loans, which could have been used, following the path of other
countries, to rebuild infrastructure in the country after decades of devastation and
war (Fallows 45).
The decades-long US embargo severely impeded the Vietnamese economy
and contributed to the low economic growth rate. Surprisingly, however, the U.S.
embargo is not often mentioned in the mainstream narrative about these two
decades of reconstruction and recovery, which are universally remembered as times
of incredible hardship and suffering. Rather, the popular discourse emphasizes
Vietnamese agency and responsibility for their policy choices. The period in 1986 of
Đỏi Mới, is when Vietnam “mở cửa,” or opened its doors, to the global economy. No
mention is made of the US sanctions, which kept the door tightly closed.
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In a similar manner, larger global economic constraints is rarely mentioned
in present-day discussions of Vietnam’s economic development policy and
evolution, or in discussions on climate change adaptation. But Vietnam does not
make these decisions in a vacuum. The next section explores ways in which
Vietnam’s export-oriented growth model constrains how much choice or autonomy
Vietnamese cities have to control their increasingly market-oriented urban
development. The following section explores the substantial contradictions and
challenges of Vietnam’s apparent economic success, including its growing
dependence on debt to fund urban infrastructure and development.

Urban Entrepreneurialism and the Provincial Competitiveness Index
Under Đỏi Mới, Vietnamese cities, particularly the larger Tier 1 cities such as
Can Tho, Hanoi, Hai Phong, Danang, and Ho Chi Minh City, have more autonomy to
determine their economic growth strategies. The decentralization and devolution of
responsibility, means that local city governments need to find local sources of
revenue to invest in their local infrastructure, both for their own residents, and also
to attract outside investors. Swyngedouw (2010) describes the simultaneous
diffusion of power both downward (increasing power and responsibility to local
governments) and upward (increasing power of global institutions like finance
capital) as “glocalization.” As a Director at the Academy of Managers of
Construction, which trains urban managers throughout the country, explained:
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Each mayor is like the CEO of his own city. How can he develop strategies to
attract investment, how to develop culture, improve infrastructure so his city
can compete? How to develop cluster economies, so industries can
agglomerate? How to connect to the global network, to create opportunities.
For example, how can your city attract companies and rich people to invest in
your city to create opportunities? You need to have cooperation between
corporations, government, and citizens. (personal interview, 2017)
His rhetoric reflects a fundamental shift in how Vietnamese city officials envision
their responsibility. Whereas in the pre-Doi Moi era, more autonomous rural
development was emphasized, today, cities are seen as a key site for industrial
development that can attract outside industries and investments. City managers,
thus, are being trained to increasingly think about agglomeration economies and
public-private partnerships to attract investment.
Although land is still owned by the state, local governments have the ability
to sell land use rights, that range from short-term agricultural land leases to longterm urban residential leases, which can be passed on to children. Revenue from the
sale of land use rights makes up a significant portion of cities’ revenues, yet because
these are one-time fees and because there is not a significant property tax structure
in place, cities do not have a dependable stream of income from property taxes
(Trinh and McCluskey, 2010: 55). Given the rapid, messy, and still unfolding
transition from a collectivized state-owned property system now to a quasi-private
property system of land use-rights, the process of setting up a system of valuation
for properties is challenging.
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In this absence of a significant property tax, cities are dependent on these
one-time sales of these land use rights, which creates a structural incentive sell land
and to continue urban expansion. In addition, because agricultural land is cheaper
than urban land (Nguyen, S. 2009: 19), it also creates incentives to develop onto
farmlands, rather than urban land, since farmland is much cheaper, so the greatest
profit can be made. These structural incentives play an important role in driving
urban expansion and the loss of surrounding farmland, and the subsequent
displacement of residents in the outer less-developed periphery of cities.
Over the last two decades, large Vietnamese cities become increasingly more
responsible for setting up the infrastructure needed to attract foreign investment.
Driven by the need to attract capital, cities are perpetually in competition to become
an “international” city that is more attractive to foreign investors than other cities
(Harvey 1973). Yet in Vietnam, the criteria for what makes a region attractive is
unclear to many leaders. Having invested millions in building freeways and setting
up industrial zones, some cities and provinces are confused to find that their
industrial zones sit under-utilized (Q. Nguyen, 2017). The blame is always put back
on the government for its failure to provide an attractive environment for investors
(Shira, 2017)
When asked about his vision for his province in the next 20 years, the
second-highest ranking provincial officer in Quang Nam province declared that he
wanted to make his province one of the top twenty highest-ranked provinces in the
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Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI). Developed by the Vietnam Chamber of
Commerce with support from USAID, the PCI Index ranks Vietnam’s 54 provinces
based on a variety of indicators, including perceptions of land access and security of
tenure, entry costs, transparency and access to information, informal costs
(bribery), time costs and regulatory compliance, legal institutions, labor and
training, and business support services, (PCI website).
The fact that the PCI would have such an influence on a city leader highlights
how important attracting outside investment has become to the city leaders, often at
the cost of other regulatory responsibilities. The PCI explains, for example, that
“Time costs and regulatory compliance” reflects “how much time firms waste on
bureaucratic compliance, as well as for how long firms must shut down for
inspections by local regulatory agencies.” The indicators for this measurement
include: “the percentage of firms spending over 10% of their time dealing with
bureaucratic regulations”, the median number of inspections by any agency; and a
subjective assessment if “government officials have become more effective (%Yes).”
The political ideology embedded in the PCI sees state regulation as “bureaucratic”
and a “waste” of a firm’s time, calling for a “rollback” of such meddlesome state
intervention. Yet not all government intervention is considered negative, since the
PCI looks favorably upon increasing public investments in job training and business
support services. These business support services, which include “private sector
trade promotion, business partner matchmaking, and provision of industrial zones
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or clusters, reflect the corollary “roll-out” of new neoliberal institutions and publicprivate partnerships required by international capital today.
In addition, Vietnam’s one-party state can also guarantee the legal
suppression and control of workers through the Vietnam General Federation of
Labour, which is one of the many mass organizations led by the Communist Party.
Independent trade unions are prohibited in Vietnam, and the state actively
intervenes to keep wages and labor resistance low, in order to remain competitive
(Human Rights Watch 2009). As The Economist reports:
The foreign chambers also complained about Vietnamese labour laws
that limit workers to 200 hours of overtime a year, or 300 hours in
some circumstances. This is far below the 900 hours of overtime
allowed in other countries in the region, such as Thailand and
Malaysia, and means that some companies struggle to fill orders
during the busiest times of the year. … For some companies, the
prospect of expanding operations in countries such as Indonesia,
Myanmar and Cambodia appears increasingly attractive. The latest
EuroCham Vietnam survey found that 34% of respondents planned to
ramp up their operations in the country, compared with 42% in the
previous poll. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013)
In these ways, the authoritarian neoliberal city represents another manifestation of
the new global cities emerging from the neoliberal discipline being imposed
throughout the world.
Given this context in which the Vietnamese government’s largest priority is
to stimulate economic growth, the separation of discussions of economic
development strategy and climate adaptation strategy undermines the potential for
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success of the adaptation strategies, and in the long-term, the economic
development strategies as well. The next section explores the role that international
finance and capital play in constraining the choices for development projects that
build climate resilience.
Role of International Finance and Capital in Determining Development
After decades of war and sanctions, Vietnamese cities needed and still need
capital to invest in roads, freeways, water systems, and other large-scale
infrastructure systems for their own urban development and also to attract more
outside investment. In order to build the freeways, bridges, and water and energy
infrastructure demanded by residents and foreign investors, Vietnamese cities have
to take out loans of often hundreds of millions of dollars from both public and
private financial institutions. These international financial institutions exercise
tremendous power over Vietnam’s economic and political restructuring through
their loans, as well as through their advice, technical assistance, and assessments of
Vietnam’s macroeconomic conditions and investment environment.
For example, from 2012-2016 the World Bank committed to supporting
economic and policy reform in Vietnam through its five-year National Partnership
Strategy (2012-2016), which focuses on “manpower development, market
mechanism enhancement, and infrastructure development” (Saigon Times, July 28,
2012). Victoria Kwakwa, the World Bank’s Country Director for Vietnam, points out
that the World Bank would provide $1-$1.5 Billion in financing in 2012 alone to
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support these strategies. The World Bank’s significant lending and aid financing to
Vietnam indicate its growing influence in Vietnam’s policy reforms and state
restructuring. Statements from World Bank Vice President for East Asia and Pacific
region Pamela Cox, and from Vietnamese Finance Minister Vuong Dinh Hue, during
Cox’s visit to Hanoi on July 26, 2012, highlight how the World Bank loans are
intended to build a legal framework for the restructuring of state-run businesses”
(Nhan Dan newspaper, July 26, 2017). Given the power asymmetry between the
World Bank and Vietnam, it’s not surprising that international institutions like the
World Bank are often invited to help essential rewrite the legal frameworks and
policies in Vietnam. Thus, when Cox urges the country to “boost the reform process,
and restructure public investment, the financial sector and State-owned
enterprises” (Saigon Times, July 28, 2012), these recommendations have a powerful
influence on Vietnamese policy, backed up by hundreds of millions of dollars in
loans that are conditioned on Vietnam taking steps towards these financial and state
industrial sector reforms.
At the end of June 2017, Vietnam is no longer eligible for most concessional
financing (with lower interest rates and more generous repayment periods) from
the World Bank, due to Vietnam’s entrance into middle-income status. The World
Bank’s lead economist in Hanoi, Sebastian Eckhardt, explained in an interview that
“Vietnam’s financing needs are growing rapidly, and official financing will not be
enough to meet the development needs of the country -- so an increasing share of
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the financing will have to be mobilized from capital markets.” (World Bank press
release 2016). Thus, in the last few years, Vietnam has increasingly had to turn to
the capital markets to sell bonds which pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and
hedge funds can purchase.
Vietnam’s dependence on private international financing for major
infrastructure projects has huge significant impacts on its economic development
strategies. Paying back these loans requires foreign currency, and the only way to
get foreign currency is through exports. The export-driven development strategy
manifests itself in urban development through the prioritization of industrial zones,
or industrial parks, which consist of land that has been set aside with specific state
strategies to attract new manufacturing plants Public funds in these industrial
zones include investments in freeways, electricity and energy infrastructure, and
access to water (Shira, 2017).
This orientation towards external markets means that domestic needs and
consumption are often neglected or less emphasized. For example, infrastructure
investments to help the urban poor have access to basic services go unfunded, while
investments are funneled instead to polluting industrial zones that offer valuable
foreign currency (2010, Hildyard). Moreover, infrastructure investments prioritize
the rate of return on investment, often at the expense of building climate resilience.
Michael Digregorio pointed out that in this new age of market liberalization, it can
be difficult to even know where the investment is coming from. “Someone could be
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building a new resort in Danang with a company registered in Vietnam, but you
can’t see that the funding is coming from Korea, or Japan, or has an off-shore
subsidiary,” he explained. “You can’t see Chinese money.” Foreign investors looking
for higher profits are less likely to be feel responsible for communities and
ecosystems that are located far away.
Thus, Vietnam’s climate change adaptation strategies are heavily influenced
by the directives and priorities of the international financial institutions that also
shape their climate adaptation and economic development strategies. In this way,
Vietnam’s liberalization means that the state is not necessarily being dismantled,
but rather is being reformed as a more effective vehicle to advance market-led
development. The next section explores the ways which the Vietnamese state is
transforming its role in the post-socialist economy.
The “Rollback” of Corporate Taxes and State-Owned Enterprises
Under Vietnam’s unique form of neoliberalism, the one-party state retains
complete control over all levels of government, and plays an active role in investing
public money to attract private investment. For example, Prime Minister Nguyen
Xuan Phuc recently announced in March of 2018, that Vietnam would be cutting the
corporate income tax rates from the current 20-22% to 15-17% (Nhan Dan 2018).
In an effort to make Vietnam more competitive, Prime Minister Phuc also said that
tax reform and creating a favorable business environment were top priorities of
Vietnam’s government (Nhan Dan 2018). The rollback of corporate taxes is a clear
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example of the shift in the role of the Vietnamese state, as reduced tax revenue
means fewer funds to invest in social services.
The restructuring of the state-owned enterprise sector is another example of
the neoliberal project to “roll back” various forms of state intervention as part of a
state-led market liberalization process. In the 1970s and 1980s before ĐỏiMới
reforms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam operated “in a highly centrally
planned and subsidized environment.” Prior to 1986, “the state assigned to SOEs
plans which had been approved by higher government levels, which included a
system of targets, such as gross output, total value of production, main products,
totally payroll, profits, and transfers to the government budget. The government
supplied the main materials, provided the markets for the products, and set their
selling prices.” (Nguyen and Tran 1996). Present-day SOEs are more autonomous
and responsible for their profit-making, and thus have become more marketoriented. Nonetheless, SOEs remain powerful in the Vietnamese economy and critics
decry SOE’s poor performance, arguing that they drain government resources,
without clear transparency about decision-making and profits.
According to the World Bank and other general international financial
institutions, the “inefficiency” of SOEs is holding back the competitiveness of the
Vietnamese economy (Hai and O’Donnell, 2017; “World Bank Wants to Help
Vietnam Speed Up Reform,” 2012). Today, the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank continue to call for the restructuring of the SOE sector. "The majority of the
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SOE sector in Vietnam is not using the public resources in the most efficient way,”
Victoria Kwakwa, the head of the World Bank office in Vietnam, recently stated. “To
keep moving forward to reform these two key sectors will be critical for enhancing
the competitiveness of Vietnamese economy" (Xinhua, March 30, 2012).
The reform of the state-owned enterprise sector in Vietnam has involved
converting small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises into joint stock
companies with limited liabilities, (Asian Development Bank Newsbrief, December
22, 2011). According to the ADB website, “many of the remaining SOEs are large,
complex and weak performers, accounting for 40% of assets in the enterprise
sector.” Following up on an earlier “multi-tranche financing facility,” another grant
of $1.2 million will be devoted to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of
Finance to “update institutional and policy frameworks governing SOE
restructuring, drawing on lessons learned from pilot restructurings.” Despite
significant concerns and critiques of the privatization process becoming a source of
windfall profits for some well-connected elites, the ADB, World Bank, and other
international financial leaders continue to push the drumbeat for privatization. The
pressures to privatize state-owned enterprises mark a fundamental restructuring of
Vietnam’s economy (Janssen, 2017). From the financial sector to the state-owned
enterprise sector, Vietnam’s economy is undergoing a structural adjustment that is
driven by its need for external capital, primarily in the form of loans from
international financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development
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Bank. Increasingly, countries giving Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) are
replacing funding for development aid with “climate finance” to encourage climate
mitigation and adaptation projects (Brown et al., 2010). In this way, Vietnam’s
climate change adaptation strategies are heavily influenced by the directives and
priorities of the international financial institutions that also shape their economic
development strategies.
Public-Private Partnerships and Infrastructure as an Asset Class
Vietnam’s turn to public-private partnerships is one example of the
increasing power of private capital in shaping infrastructure development choices.
Vietnam’s decision to focus on export-oriented development means that a large
amount of industrial infrastructure must be built to attract foreign investors.
Vietnam currently invests 5.7% of its GDP in infrastructure, the highest rate in
Southeast Asia (“Vietnam Is Heavyweight Among Asia’s Infrastructure Spenders,”
2017). However, the Asian Development Bank estimates that Vietnam needs at least
$480 billion from 2017-2030 to meet its growing list of infrastructure needs as an
industrializing country, including highways, dike systems, ports, industrial zones,
and power plants. (Janssen, 2017). Arguing that governments do not have enough
money to pay for the vast amount of infrastructure needed for Vietnam to become a
leading export-driven economy in Asia, multilateral development banks like the
World Bank and China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are
encouraging Vietnam to “leverage domestic and international capital markets, and
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attract private investments” to fund export zones, transportation corridors and
other industrial infrastructure (Lauridson, 2017, UNESCAP 2017).
The increasing dependence of Vietnam on public-private partnerships to
fund industrial and even basic services infrastructure represents the neoliberal
expansion of state institutions to roll back the responsibilities of state governments,
while advance the power and control of the private sector. These public-private
partnerships come in a variety of forms, from BOO (Build-Own-Operate)
agreements to BOT (Build-Own-Transfer)2 to other complex arrangements, but
what they share in common is some kind of contractual guarantee from the
government of profit. As Jean Perarnaud of Partners Group, a private equity
investment management firm, explained, “For us, infrastructure is stable, contracted
cash flow for the long term” (as quoted in Hildyard 2014). This steady cash flow
comes from contractual agreements that governments sign, giving payment
guarantees, revenue guarantees, and legal rights to keep the state’s infrastructure
until the state has paid its debts to the companies. Governments must provide some
government-backed guarantees of long-term profitability; thus the government
shoulders the risk for new projects, while private company is guaranteed a profit.

Under the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model, a private entity builds owns, and operates a facility,
while under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, a private entity constructs and operates a facility
for a certain number of years, recovering its investment through revenue from the project. After a
certain number of years, ownership and operation of the facility is transferred back to the state.
2
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Previously, public international development funders such as the World
Bank or the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), were primary
funders of infrastructure development. Today, however, given the funding gap for
ambitious infrastructure projects (ranging from new oil refineries, and pipelines, to
more mundane water treatment plants), private equity firms are increasingly
playing a larger role in infrastructure financing. Because of activist and advocacy
pressure, the World Bank has adopted a list of required safeguard assessments—
including assessments of impacts on the environment, indigenous peoples,
involuntary resettlement, safety of dams, projects in disputed areas, and projects on
international waterways. The private equity firms, however, have weaker or nonexistent safeguard policies, as demonstrated by the aggressive funding of
destructive coal-fired plans. The World Bank and other development banks begun to
back away from funding new fossil fuel infrastructure (Elliott, 2017), in part due to
pressure from advocates to honor the climate mitigation policies adopted by their
home countries. The un-transparent and unaccountable structure of private equity
firms makes it more difficult to lobby for socially beneficial outcomes on
investments. Again, the overall development goal is key to determining the type of
infrastructure needed. Infrastructure decisions are not politically neutral. “There is
more than enough public money available to fund the everyday infrastructure
needed to ensure heating, lighting, healthcare, clean water and other amenities for
ordinary people,” writes Nicholas Hildyard (2016). “But there is not the money
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available through conventional infrastructure finance to fund the just-in-time
corridors that capital needs.”
Whereas previously infrastructure was seen as an unprofitable “public good,”
private equity firms are increasingly seeing public private partnerships as an
opportunity to gain public underwriting and guarantees for projects that offer
steady returns at above-average profit rates of between 13 to 25% (Hildyard 2014).
Goldman Sachs, in their report “Building the World,” advances a very explicit policy
agenda for expanding private financing of infrastructure projects in which
“governmental interference” is kept “at a minimum.” At the same time, they demand
the expansion of state intervention and subsidies in the form of “public/private
partnerships, government credit guarantees, and coinvestment by governments.”
(Goldman Sachs, as quoted by Hildyard 2010). In Vietnam, private financing and
public-private partnerships are increasingly seen as the only solution to the
widening infrastructure funding gap.
The Long Phu 1 coal-fired power plant described in Chapter 2 is but one
example of many coal-fired power plants funded or searching for funds using
public-private partnership agreements. Expected to cost roughly $1.9 billion, the
project has already gotten funding from a Russian development bank Vnesheconom.
To fill the remaining funding needed, HSBC Bank, Cathay United Bank, JP
MorganChase, and Mitsubishi UFJ have signed on as the “lead arrangers behind a
planned $650 million loan for the plant” (BankTrack website 2018). Despite the
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Paris Climate Accord goals, which require a steady decline in coal production and
which the United Kingdom, Japan, China, and Russia all signed, their export credit
agencies and national and multinational development banks have all chosen to fund
this nearly $2 billion coal-fired power plant, locking Vietnam into decades of
burning dirty coal with older technology.
The public private partnerships for infrastructure development highlight the
role that private finance is increasingly playing in determining infrastructure in
Vietnam, developments that are ostensibly aimed to strengthen climate adaptation
or expand access to public services. Vietnam’s increasing dependence on
international loans and the demands of their private and public funders requires
that short-term profit returns are often prioritized over the long-term needs of
building communities’ climate resilience.
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Chapter 5: Critique of mainstream climate change adaptation
The construction of climate change adaptation knowledge is inextricably
linked to the international development and international finance industries.
International development/financial institutions such as the Asian Development
Bank, World Bank, and United Nations, lead efforts to study and document climate
impacts, risks, and vulnerability.
In recent years, international financial institutions like the Asian
Development Bank and World Bank have moved beyond merely giving out money.
They now play critical roles as creators, aggregators, and purveyors of knowledge
(“Knowledge Bank,” World Bank website). Indeed, the power of public international
financial institutions such as the World Bank and development agencies such as
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), stems not simply from their large
loans and aid packages, but from their control over the dominant conceptualizations
of how economies should be run, what good governance looks like, and now
increasingly, how countries should respond and adapt to climate change. Although
in their materials on their website, knowledge is presented as an unproblematic
‘good,’ in fact these ideas (about policy frameworks, how to set up economic
institutions) are deeply political and enforce a particular system of political,
economic, and social relations.

68

The ISET Urban Climate Resilience Framework in Figures 2 and 3, is one
example of common climate adaptation frameworks for understanding the process
of building a community’s adaptive capacity or resilience in the face of climate

FIGURE 2: ISET URBAN CLIMATE RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK
change. Other NGOs, such as CARE, or international financial institutions such as the
World Bank have similar approaches, all of which feature a process of assessing a
community’s exposure, sensitivity, and vulnerability to climate hazards, with a
corresponding process for gathering stakeholders together to plan, prioritize,
implement, and evaluate actions taken to strengthen community resilience.
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While vulnerability assessments are a key step in climate adaptation
planning, the root causes of those vulnerabilities must also be addressed. The ISET
Framework lumps all individuals, households, communities, businesses,
governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, under the
category of “Agents,” without delving into the unequal power relations between
Agents which are in fact at the root of many of communities’ vulnerability. ISET’s
Urban Climate Resilience Framework explains that communities that are politically,
socially, or economically marginalized, such as slum dwellers, people living in

FIGURE 3: CORE ELEMENTS OF ISET' S URBAN CLIMATE RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK
floodplain areas, low-income renters, women, and women-headed households, are
particularly vulnerable to climate hazards (Moench, Tyler, et al 2011). Although
these communities are undoubtedly more vulnerable to climate change, the
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framework and other mainstream approaches treat vulnerability as a characteristic
or condition of groups of people, not a consequence (James, et al. 2015). In reality,
these communities’ vulnerabilities are the result of other social, economic, and
political systems and inequalities.
By not addressing the inherent economic and political systems in which this
climate change adaptation is embedded, these discussions of climate change
adaptation and green growth are missing important analyses that would help cities
look comprehensively at the real conditions and forces which they need to address if
they want to realistically prepare for the current and coming climate impacts.
Movement Generation Justice & Ecology Project, a non-profit organization based in
Oakland, CA, writes in Pathways to Resilience (2015):
[In conventional climate adaptation frameworks], the policy and
practices that have been brought to bear don’t address the underlying
historical roots of vulnerability. In fact, they often exacerbate
vulnerability by denying communities the chance to address economic
disparity when leading adaptation and mitigation efforts (25).
The failure to interrogate the existing political and economic systems make it more
likely that proposed climate solutions might actually hurt vulnerable communities
and exacerbate inequalities. For example, seawalls displace fisherpeople, while also
leading to greater coastal erosion in the next town lacking seawalls, and roads that
are built higher to allow cars to avoid flooding, end up increasing flooding for those
villages upstream from the elevated roads.
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Good governance and the post-political approach
Critical urban theorists have used the term “post-political” to describe the
ways in which contemporary consensus-based planning has erased the conflicts
over power and resources (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2010).
Rather than confront and challenge the unequal power relations which are
embedded in urban planning challenges, the post-political approach focuses on
participatory processes to strengthen and validate the inherently political choices
being made. Similarly, the literature produced by international NGOs and
governmental agencies suggests that effective climate change adaptation is
primarily about improving urban planning processes and reforming institutions to
be more transparent, accountable, and participatory so that local people can be
more engaged in directing and carrying out adaptive strategies (World Resources
Institute, 2011). The IMF, World Bank and other international institutions have
declared "good governance as a necessary prerequisite for almost any development
goal, whether economic growth or effective urban development (IMF 2012). These
“good governance” practices include improving government transparency,
accountability, participatory processes, consensus-based decision-making, and the
prioritization of equity and inclusion.
Many of these “good governance” reforms are theoretically beneficial, yet
they are rooted in Western liberal democratic traditions, and in Vietnam’s political
system, with a one-party authoritarian state and no independent media or trade
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unions and a very weak civil society, it is questionable how well these governance
reforms can be effectively translated, taught, and adopted. In addition, the clear
emphasis on public-private partnerships and infrastructure projects suggest that
these reforms are focused more on making Vietnam a more investment-friendly
environment, than on promoting democratic participation or mechanisms for public
accountability.
The apolitical “good governance” perspective for climate resilience
emphasizes integrated management of resources (such as water management at the
watershed basin scale) and encouraging different sectors to better coordinate plans.
These practical solutions fit within the dominant technocratic solutions presented
by most international non-governmental organizations. What is noticeably missing
is a discussion of the underlying urban expansion model and the dependence of the
city government on the continuing sale of land for a significant portion of its
revenues. The expansion of urban development into coastal wetlands and estuaries
increases a city’s vulnerability to sea level rise, flooding, and typhoons. Of course, it
is easier to discuss technocratic reforms, than to discuss transforming the
fundamental economic basis of the city. Yet the underlying economic model of the
city is of critical importance and relevance to a city’s climate change adaptation.
Without a doubt, stories of uncoordinated development abound, as my
interview participants could attest. Better coordination, integrated planning, and
good governance practices would indeed improve a city’s ability to develop and
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implement a plan to adapt to climate change. Yet in this framework, the larger
economic and political systems in which this planning and governance is embedded,
is never mentioned. Better intersectoral coordination and participatory processes
will have limited impact if the larger economic development systems and pressures
towards growth are left unchanged.
Given that independent trade unions and political demonstrations are
prohibited and the state has a strong incentive to suppress strikes and worker
dissent, the emphasis on inclusive participation seems somewhat naïve. The
Vietnamese mass organizations such as the Women’s Union, the Vietnamese Trade
Union, the Youth Union, the Farmer’s Union, do offer one mechanism for public
participation. Indeed, many NGOs rely on such state structures to be able to have
access to particular constituencies of “women farmers” or “youth” for their
participatory workshops. But given that these mass organizations are embedded
firmly within the Vietnamese Community Party organizational structure, de facto
arms of the Communist Party, the participation of such women farmers or workers,
may not result in the same diversity of perspectives envisioned in the theoretical
frameworks put forth under collaborative governance and communicative planning.
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The ‘good governance’
framework does emphasize
equity and inclusion, but
remains silent on the power
inequalities between
stakeholders, such as peasant
farmers and the global

FIGURE 4: UNITED NATIONS GOOD G OVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK

companies seeking to build an industrial park. The simplified frameworks for
participatory decisionmaking in mainstream discourses on participatory climate
change assessments and prioritizations thus ignore, and thus serve to reinforce the
unequal power relations. In these frameworks, it seems completely irrational for
local governments develop in ways that are completely contradictory to what would
be in the long-term and even short-term interests of their residents. Within this
post-political discourse, writes Jessop (2002), “pollution and environmental
destruction appear to be facts of nature, rather than products of specific sets of
social relations” (469). In Vietnam, environmental damage is treated as unintended
consequences that can be fixed by better management and coordination, rather than
inevitable outcomes intrinsic to Vietnam’s development strategy. As Edgar Pieterse
(2008) writes, “There is no explicit line drawn between the conditions the
document seeks to remedy and the causal drivers of those conditions” (68). The
emphasis on effective planning and coordination to respond to climate change
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adaptation reinforces this post-political erasure of the unequal social relations
which cause disparate climate vulnerability, as well as the political choices involves.
Despite the supposed separation of climate science from politics, climate
adaptation planning requires value-laden decisions, not simply technical decisions,
about what areas of town should be protected, at what cost, and what groups’
interests should be prioritized. Should the hotel developers be protected with an
investment in sea dykes which come at great cost, and offer only temporary
protection? What about the fisherpeople who have been resettled to make way for
the hotels? The adaptations needed often involve fundamental, transformational
actions, such as relocation from an area that will become increasingly inundated, or
livelihood diversification for farmers. These are not purely objective decisions that
can be determined by experts, but in fact demand deliberation and participation by
the people who will be expected to change their lives and who will bear the brunt of
the impacts of these changes.
Without a power analysis, these methodologies for climate change decisionmaking remain idealistic guidelines without giving people the analytical tools
needed to confront the high-stakes, life-and-death decisions that need to be made.
The loose definition of eco-city development leads some city governments to frame
the actions of neoliberal development within the discourse of sustainable
development and climate change adaptation. For example, in Danang, the city
government has produced city development plans that emphasize their goal to
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become an eco-city by eliminating industrial pollution ‘hotspots,’ improving waste
management and land use planning, and re-orienting urban development practices
to be more environmentally-sensitive and sustainable. (Nguyen DONRE Danang
presentation 2009). Some of the key accomplishments of which Danang is proud,
include: “the removal of all slums (350 households) living on the banks of the Han
River and the resettlement of over 60,000 households.” These ‘environmental
projects’ are essentially what in the US is known as urban renewal, according to
Professor Burkhard von Rabeneau (personal communication 2012). This conflation
of urban renewal with climate change adaptation reveals the embeddedness of
climate change policy in existing economic and political systems of power. Just as
over 60,000 households can be moved in the name of sustainable city development,
government-sponsored climate change adaptation can also reinforce the existing
power relations that are already pushing out poor people from desirable land in the
city. Unless the powerful economic forces reshaping the city are acknowledged in
climate change plans, climate change adaptation strategies remain woefully
inadequate and ill-equipped to adapt to climate-related change and build climate
resilience.
Green Growth as the new Post-Political Framework for Action
In attempting to balance economic, social, and environmental demands,
Vietnam has embraced the popular concept of “green growth” as a win-win-win
solution that address the needs of cities looking for more investment and looking to
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prepare for climate change. The Asian Development Bank declares: “Green growth is
economic progress that fosters environmentally sustainable low-carbon and socially
inclusive development.” Green growth, or “climate-smart development” has become
an increasingly popular focus for other international development funders. In 2012,
South Korea pledged financial support for Vietnam’s Green Growth strategy, and Ha
Chan-ho, Korean Ambassador to Vietnam, said “green growth is one of the three key
areas in Korea’s Country Partnership Strategy with Vietnam,” at the signing
ceremony of a memorandum of understanding. In 2016, South Korea’s Global Green
Growth Institute (GGGI) and Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment signed
a five-year partnership strategy called the GGGI Vietnam Country Planning
Framework 2016-2020 to “work together to deliver green growth in the finance,
urban and energy sectors”(Vietnam Investment Review 2016).
Although opportunities exist for enterprises to make money through more
environmentally friendly or even regenerative practices, many resilience-building
activities such as restoring wetlands as part of coastal protection efforts, will remain
unprofitable, especially compared to other business projects. Implicit in this green
growth strategy is an assumption that Vietnam’s current orientation towards
export-driven economic growth is compatible with efforts to protect the
environment and human health, and to adapt to climate change. A joint United
Nations/Asian Development Bank report explains: “A key concept in approaching
green growth is recognition that economic, social and environmental systems are
actually complementary, not in conflict. For those focusing on the environment,
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green growth is a way to reduce environmental stress; for economists, it can offer
increased profits and competitiveness; and for social scientists, it can contribute to
ensuring that basic needs are met” (Green Growth, Resources, and Resilience, 2012, p.
xv)
Under this framework, even catastrophic climate change offers an
opportunity for economic growth. As this report from the Economics of Climate
Change Working Group titled “Shaping Climate-Resilient Development: A
Framework for Decision-Making” (2009) explains:
Climate resilience boosts economic development. These adaptation
measures are in many cases also effective steps to strengthen economic
development. This is particularly so in the agricultural cases, where
measures to adapt to climate risk, such as increased focus on cash crops,
can generate revenues greatly exceeding the climate-related loss averted
by those measures—and so contribute to improvements in national or
regional wealth. For example, in Mali, greater cultivation of cash crops
would provide on the order of $2bn in additional revenue for the
country. --“The Economics of Climate Change Adaptation” (36)
This narrow GDP-based conceptualization of climate change impacts ignores the
ways in which a shift to greater cultivation of cash crops would endanger food
security, without any guarantee that the benefits from additional export revenues
would be equitably distributed (Altieri et al., 2012). In reality, the current drive to
increase exports places tremendous pressures on cities to sacrifice environmental
and human health in order to attract investment and stimulate economic growth.
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Several cities in the central region of Vietnam, including Danang and Hoi An,
have expressed interest in becoming eco-cities in the future (von Rabeneau, 2012).
The definition of what it means to be an eco-city, remains unclear, however. In
Danang, for example, eco-city projects include the construction of luxury resorts, a
wastewater treatment plant (with support from a World Bank loan), and an
information technology industrial zone. In this way, the flexible interpretations and
labeling of eco-city projects suggest that many of these ‘green-growth’ strategies are
often simply another way to attract both development loans and investment to
areas of Vietnam.
In a report on Danang’s urban development strategies, Burkhard von
Rabeneau describes how the city government is trucking in tons of dirt to fill in
floodplain/estuary areas because the city is running out of land to sell (von
Rabeneau, personal communication, 2012). Clearly, this development of a
floodplain/estuary increases Danang’s vulnerability to floods, yet the structural
logic of Danang’s current revenue system almost forces cities to continually expand
outwards, even if it means destroying land that could reduce flood risks and damage
by hurricanes and storms. Without addressing these structural pressures of
economic growth, the green growth discourse reflects the same post-political
orientation of the good governance and climate change adaptation discourse.
In the narrative of building urban climate resilience in Vietnam, green
growth has become the new strategy for financial institutions seeking to continue
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lending money to Vietnam, while also acknowledging the dire threats facing
Vietnam in the future. The post-political framework accepts the current “market-assupreme” capitalist system as an immutable fact of nature, rather than a particular
system in this historical moment, that is undermining the very ecological
foundations (stable climate, coastlines, and precipitation patterns) upon which this
current economy depends.
Given that international financial institutions, development agencies, and
private foundations are deeply integrated into the global economic system, perhaps
it should not be surprising that the dominant climate change adaptation narrative
and approach in Vietnam accepts neoliberalism as the unquestioned underlying
political-economic framework within which Vietnam must implement its adaptation
strategies. Jameson states that in the current neoliberal era, perhaps “it is easier to
imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism” (Jameson, 2003:
73, as quoted in Swyngedouw, 2010: 216). Indeed, the hegemonic nature of global
neoliberalism does make it difficult to imagine replacing free market global
capitalism with a less ecologically and socially destructive system. Yet the growing
signs of ecological devastation and predictions of even further devastation in the
coming decades suggest that Vietnam’s market-driven, growth-at-all-costs economic
model must be addressed in order to make any significant progress on climate
change adaptation.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Given the devastating impacts that the projected flooding, drought,
hurricanes, and sea level rise are having and will have on millions of Vietnamese
people within the next few decades, it is striking how decidedly reformist and
technical are the recommendations of climate change adaptation practitioners.
Effects of Vietnam’s growth-first economic development strategy are already
undermining long-term viability of many economic sectors, from fishing to tourism
to agriculture. From the deaths of coral reefs upon which fisheries depend
(O’Loughlin, 2009), to the impact of extreme heat, saltwater intrusion, and drought
on agriculture upon which the majority of Vietnamese rely on for survival (Fuchs,
2010; Hong 2016; Tran, 2011), the signs are clear that continuing the “business-asusual” approach will result eventually, and likely within this century, in a collapse of
many ecological and agricultural systems that underpin the economy (World Bank,
2012).
The failure of climate change adaptation and resilience literature to seriously
interrogate overall economic development goals, pathways, and assumptions
reflects a foundational weakness in theory and analysis that undermines Vietnam’s
ability to successfully adapt to climate change. In this paper, I explored the ways in
which mainstream climate change adaptation focuses on improving planning
processes, while ignoring the larger political choices and economic models and
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strategies which are assumed, yet never raised in the climate adaptation literature.
To understand the discrepancy between the climate change adaptation discourse
and actual practice, this paper examined Vietnam’s economic and institutional
structures which drive urban development. By exploring Vietnam’s dependence on
international loans for its infrastructure development, this section shows how
Vietnamese cities’ abilities to choose a more sustainable and climate-resilient path
are circumscribed by the restrictions imposed by global capital. Although
opportunities do exist to combine economic development and climate change
adaptation and poverty reduction, there are inevitable tradeoffs. A de-politicized
win-win-win approach to climate change adaptation ignores the fundamental
contradictions between Vietnam’s economic growth model, its revenue generating
strategies, and its climate change adaptation and resiliency goals.
Future Directions for Research
The findings from my study suggest several important directions for future
research. Future research is needed to delve more deeply into the institutional,
political and economic forces that shape decision-making on urban infrastructure
development. Through my initial document analysis and interviews, I began to
uncover questions about the financing of projects and the expanding role of publicprivate partnerships (PPP), but more research is needed to understand the role and
influence of international financial institutions in the development process. A case
study approach that focuses on one or more infrastructure projects could illuminate
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the institutional and economic forces which shape decision-making, as well as the
benefits and costs that cities assume in using public-private partnerships to fund
such infrastructure. Additionally, in the last ten to fifteen years, China has become
an important and powerful player in Vietnam’s infrastructure development, with a
distinctly different approach from the World Bank and other Western financial
institutions; further research is also needed to understand the implications of this
shift in the source of infrastructure finance.
Lastly, my study findings suggest that more research is needed to explore
alternative models for urban development that support human health and build
climate resilience. Feminist and ecological economics have long put forth alternative
frameworks and strategies for development and progress, yet these frameworks
have gained little traction in Vietnam. Further research is needed to understand
Vietnamese discourses on development and progress. Given that several of my
interviewees’ comments suggested a correlation between the expansion of free
markets and private property with a corresponding political liberalization and an
expansion of individual freedoms, future research is needed to explore the narrative
strategies that are most effective in Vietnam to advance alternative urban
development strategies that also build communities’ adaptive capacity. This final
section explores some initial concepts for communicating new narratives about
what development and climate resilience can look like.
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Redefining Climate Adaptation and Resilience: A Vision for a Just Transition
This thesis draws attention to the ways in which the mainstream climate
change adaptation approaches, funded by international development and finance
institutions, and implemented by Vietnamese planners and NGO professionals, are
failing to propose solutions and strategies that are commensurate to the scale of the
existential threat facing Vietnam. What’s needed is nothing less than a social,
political and economic transformation. Recently social movements have used the
term “just transition” to describe the process of moving from the old fossil fuel
economy to a renewable, regenerative economy and society (James et al., 2015). The
concept of a just transition originated in the 1960s from the trade union movement,
in recognition that workers employed in destructive industries needed to be
supported and trained to be able to find jobs in more regenerative and less harmful
industries. Today, the concept of a just transition encompasses the idea that the
transition to a new economy is not merely a technical transition of technologies, but
also challenges the unjust power relations which underpin the current extractive
fossil fuel economy. In this last section, I examine lessons from this study as well as
from other communities and social movements that point to an alternative approach
to building climate resilience in Vietnam.
To begin with, building urban climate resilience must begin with an
acknowledgment of the root causes of climate change. The false separation between
climate mitigation and climate adaptation must end. One of the root causes of
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climate change is the consumer-based growth economy, which depends on an
extractive, fossil-fuel based energy infrastructure. As discussed earlier, the
international development funders are themselves embedded in political economic
systems that are dependent on maintaining unequal power relations. Rather than
challenge the U.S. on its vastly disproportionate per capita emissions of greenhouse
gases, the global climate change industry instead forces countries to look inward,
and to focus on the ways in which their local actions of conserving forests or
improving local planning, can help them adapt to catastrophic climate change which
the funder and the larger unequal political and economic systems themselves are
largely responsible.
Secondly, building climate resilience and a just transition means moving
money away from the fossil fuel economy and re-investing in a new renewable
economy. The Vietnamese government believes that they have no choice-- that
maintaining economic growth requires that they continue to fund oil exploration
and more than double the number of coal-fired power plants from up to 20 coal
plants in 2018 to 51 coal plants in 2030 (Chugh 2017). It’s true that investing in
solar and wind would offer new constraints—and opportunities—for industrial
projects. But if the current type of unfettered growth-at-all-costs development is
allowed to continue, Vietnam’s ecosystems upon which a majority of the population
still depend on for their livelihoods, particularly in the coastal and Mekong Delta
and Red River Delta regions, will collapse. One of the implicit assumptions of the
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mainstream climate change adaptation approach is that we can avoid catastrophic
climate change without fundamentally altering the current economy. Avoiding
catastrophic climate change and building resilience to the inevitable impacts that
are inevitable, requires that we must take a radically new approach.
Thirdly, a new climate resilience framework should also address the causes
of climate vulnerability. As discussed earlier, mainstream climate change adaptation
literature treats vulnerability as a planning consideration, without examining the
root causes. For example, planners are exhorted to reach out to low-income renters
without residency permits be included in participatory planning workshops to
ensure that their voices and experiences are included in the decision-making. Yet,
the systemic causes of their lack of formal residency rights remains unaddressed. To
be effective, solutions have to address the power inequalities which create such
vulnerability.
Fourthly, a just transition means democratic governance and participation of
those most impacted. While good governance is truly a prerequisite and foundation
for climate change adaptation, the concept of good governance has to move beyond
shallow definitions of corruption and transparency. Corruption does not merely
mean accepting a personal bribe; it can also mean the many ways in which public
funds are used to block democratic participation and to bolster private profit.
Currently, Vietnamese city officials are more accountable to their superiors in the
Party and in the government than they are to the people they serve. The lack of
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democratic accountability leads to decisions that are made to benefit private
interests at the expense of the common good, even if no bribes are exchanged. At the
same time, transparency and accountability The democratization of governance that
would allow those most directly impacted to lead is a critical step in being able to
develop plans and projects that build authentic climate resilience.
To finance such climate adaptation and resilience-building, Vietnam could
explore progressive and redistributive carbon taxes that could generate
reinvestment revenue, instead of depending on foreign loans that must be paid back.
For example, British Columbia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden have instituted
different versions of a carbon tax, reflecting the social and environmental costs of
pollution and generating revenue that can then be reinvested in renewable energy
projects or other projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These carbon
taxes, by making fossil fuels more expensive, also make investments in renewable
energy infrastructure more attractive. Analysts have pointed out that political
realities and popular push-back have made it difficult for politicians to raise carbon
taxes high enough to actually force changes in the use of fossil fuels (Jaccard, 2016).
Therefore, the Vietnamese government will likely also need to institute some kinds
of direct regulations to stop the expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure in Vietnam.
In addition, a just transition in Vietnam must build on local history, culture,
and traditional practices. Vietnam’s traditional approach to flood risk and
vulnerability, exemplified in its “Living With Floods” (sống với lũ lụt) strategy, is an
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example of an approach that draws from the local practical knowledge. Rather than
seek to build ever-more dams and structures to control flooding, the “Living With
Floods” strategy recognizes both the benefits and risks of annual flooding and uses
strategies that seek to build community capacity to respond to flooding safely
without depriving farmers of the beneficial sediments, nutrients and pest control
that regular flooding brings (Digregorio and Huynh 14).
Rather than a technocratic, “expert”-driven approach, the Vietnamese
government could look to its own history of organizing a national movement of
peasants, artists, students, and other ordinary Vietnamese people fighting for
national liberation. Drawing from the rich and long history of community resilience
during their decades of war would be one opportunity to tell the story of climate
adaptation and resilience as part of a long history of Vietnamese resistance and
resilience to foreign invasion. In this way, the adaptability, creativity, and collective
solidarity which Vietnamese drew upon during the multiple wars for national
independence would be seen as strengths that in fact Western ‘developed’ nations
would be wise to learn from—a stark reversal of the ‘deficit-based’ paradigm which
currently dominates much of the climate change discourse.
Ultimately, climate change adaptation is not merely about making policy and
technological changes; it’s also about changing people’s ideas about the kind of
development they want. In Planning as Persuasive Storytelling, James Throgmorton
(2003) argues that stories and storytelling are an extremely important but
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undervalued part of planning and that good planning includes “collecting and telling
stories about both the past and future.” Currently, as Vietnam is in a moment of
political transition from a state-planned economy to an authoritarian free market
economy, the official hegemonic narratives about the past, present, and future are
themselves being reconstructed. Building climate resilience means challenging
dominant narratives that we can address “climate change “as long as it doesn’t hurt
economic development.” In truth, addressing the exploitative and extractive
economy is key to addressing the root causes of the climate crisis.
“Stories and the ‘foundation narratives’ we tell to each other have more than
passing interest—they contain or suppress evolutionary possibilities,” argues
Stephen Moore (2007). Currently, there does not exist a strong counter-narrative
that offers a more attractive alternative to the dominant storyline that “There Is No
Alternative” to neoliberal capitalist development. Any attempt to stop the
widespread ecological destruction and strengthen Vietnam’s resilience to climate
change needs to come up with an alternative narrative that is more compelling and
attractive, to motivate a significant portion of Vietnamese to change their vision of
what development and prosperity look like.
This paper argues that Vietnam’s climate change adaptation strategies are
doomed to be ineffective unless the underlying economic growth imperatives and
economic and political inequalities are addressed. Otherwise, the myriad adaptation
reports and action plans become fairy tales, idealized plans that are unmoored from
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the actual political and economic context of Vietnam, and of the local areas in which
they are being implemented. Most importantly, without explicitly addressing power
relations, climate change adaptation strategies are likely to reinforce and even
exacerbate existing inequalities, and thus increasing vulnerability to climate change.
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